
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA 

Relations of the United States 
with Sweden 



BY 
KNUTE EMIL CARLSON 



A THESIS 



Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School 

IN Partial Fulfillment op the Requirements 

FOR THE Degree of Doctor op Philosophy. 



H. RAY HAAS & CO. 
'■ Printers and Publishers 
Allentown, Pa. 
1921 



UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA 

Relations of the United States 
with Sweden 



BY 

KNUTE EMIL CARLSON 



A THESIS 



Presented to the Faculcy of the Graduate School 

IN Pabtial Fulfillment of the Kequirements 

fob" THE Degree of Doctor of Philosophy. 



' H. RAY HAAS & CO. 

\ Printers and Publishers 

) Allentown, Pa. 

1921 



Loby Af 






COPYRIGHT, 1921, 
BY 

KNUTE EMIL CARLSON 



ixt 



INTRODUCTION 

The world war has emphasized the already apparent fact 
that the United States had hecome a world power that must be 
considered in a settlement of all important international ques- 
tions. Other nations thought that the United States was too 
much absorbed in her own economic and industrial pursuits to 
take any part in world problems, but she has proved in this 
war that her interests are wide as the world. The United States 
has also proved that economic development has not prevented 
the fostering of advanced ideals in regard to international rela- 
tions. These ideals have grown up with the nation and are not 
a recent outburst of patriotic emotion. 

In the light of this general fact it has been considered im- 
portant to study more carefully the negotiations between the 
United States and Sweden to ascertain the nature of the relations 
with that country, the problems that have been involved, and 
how those problems have been solved. A study of those nego- 
tiations has revealed the following facts: 

First, Sweden assumed a decidedly friendly attitude toward 
the United States from the very beginning and this friendship 
is illustrated by the fact that Sweden was the first nation to ask 
the privilege to make a treaty with the United States as early as 
1784, by opening up of the island of St. Bartholomew as a free 
port in order to aid in the development of the mutual commerce, 
and by requesting the exchange of public ministers. 

Second, when the two countries were suffering from the 

effects of the war between England and Napoleon, Sweden in- 

'^ vited the United States to join in a league of neutral nations to 

^ protect the interest of the neutrals. This proposition was con- 



'^ 



VI INTRODUCTION 

sidered by the American Government, which fact is proved by 
the instructions to John- Jay and the correspondence between 
James Monroe and the Secretary of State. 

Third, the Napoleonic wars brought on claims against 
Sweden as well as against other European powers, for she also 
became involved in the Continental System. Although the in- 
demnity losses incurred was tardily agreed upon, the Swedish 
Government always frankly admitted the justice of the claims 
of the American merchants and expressed willingness to pay 
the indemnity. This willingness, on the part of the Swedish 
Government, to settle the claims is illustrated by the fact that 
the Crown Prince offered a quantity of cannons and gun powder, 
his personal property, as a payment on the claims, and also 
that the Government offered to sell the island of St. Barthol- 
omev.' to the United States and to deduct from the purchase price 
the amount of the claims. 

Fourth, Swedish consular officers tendered their good ser- 
vices in behalf of American sailors and American commerce in 
Algiers. 

The source material used in preparing this study is indicated 
in the footnotes and in the appended bibliography. The mater- 
ial listed there has been carefully examined, and all irrevelent 
material has been omitted from the bibliography. 

At present only the earlier part of the study of the relations 
between the two countries is published, but it is the intention of 
the author, as soon as recent material becomes available, to pub- 
lish also that part of the study which deals wdth the problems 
growing out of the world war. 



CONTENTS 



Introduction V 

Chapter I. Negotiations During the American Revolution 1 

Chapter II. Proposed Alliance 26 

Chapter III. The Stralsund Claims 45 

Chapter IV. Commercial Negotiations 72 

Select Bibliography 91 



VJl 



CHAPTER I 

Relations During the American Revolution 

The Declaration of Independence required as a necessary 
consequence the establishment of foreign relations. Before that 
time the inhabitants of the eastern shore of North America had 
belonged to a European Power, and their relation with other 
nations was therefore part and parcel of the European balance 
of power. When independence was declared and on the way 
to become a fact these inhabitants were no longer a mere attach- 
ment to another power. The question that must be decided, 
however, was whether these young states should send representa- 
tives to other nations to request admission into the family of 
nations, or should they quietly await until independence had 
been achieved and let the commercial advantages of the country 
solicit the invitation from older nations. The latter view was 
stated in a letter from Dr. Franklin to Arthur Lee when he was 
on his fruitless mission to Spain. He said: "A virgin state 
should preserve the virgin character, and not go about suitoriug 
for alliances, but wait with decent dignity for the application 
of others. ' ' ^ 

Another class of statesmen with a ' ' broader appreciation of 
political necessity" advocated a policy of diplomatic advances. 
The question of independence involved, from their point of 
view, a great number of European interests, and they deemed 
themselves warranted in demanding effective support in exchange 
for commercial opportunities. The personification of this poli- 

* Sparks, J. Diplomatic Correspondence, II, 67; Franklin to Lee, 
March 21, 1777. 



2 EELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH SWEDEN 

cy seems to be John Adams who wrote : " I think we have not 
meanly solicited for friendship anywhere. But to send ministers 
to every court in Europe, especially the maritime courts, to 
propose an acknowledgement of the independence of America 
and treaties of amity and commerce, is no more than becomes us, 
and in my opinion is our duty to do. It is perfectly consistent 
with the genuine system of American policy, and a price of 
respect due from new nations to old ones". ^ Already about a 
month earlier he had written to the President of Congress : ' ' The 
counsels of the sovereigns of Europe are not easily penetrated ; 
but it is our duty to attend to them, and throw into view such 
information as may be in our power, that they may take no 
measure inconsistent with their and our interest for want of 
light — a misfortune that may easily happen. In this view, I 
could wish that the United States had a minister in each of the 
maritime courts — I mean Holland, Russia, Sweden, and Denmark 
and, as the cabinet of Berlin has much influence in the politics 
of Europe, Prussia".^ Arthur and William Lee also wrote to 
Congress "stating that they were informed by reliable authority 
that Spain, Holland, Prussia, Germany, Tuscany, and Sweden 
were anxious to receive American ministers".* Fortunately 
for the young republic the latter view prevailed. 

The war of the American Revolution had not proceeded fai* 
before the European nations became involved in one way or 
another, since England "claimed the right to search neutral 
vessels for contraband of war, and she exercised this right in 
a high-handed manner". Finding it impossible to obtain redress 
from England, Gustavus III, of Sweden instructed his minister 
at London (December 1778) to deliver a remonstrance to the 



^Sparks, Diplomatic Corresp., V, 361; Adams to Franklin, October 14, 
1780. 

'Wharton, F. Revolutionary Diplomatic Corresp., IV, 57; Adams to 
the President of Congress, September 16, 1780 

* Wharton, Revolutionary Diplomatic Corresp., I, 460. 



NEGOTIATIONS DURING THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 3 

English Government "couched in such sharp terms that Lord 
Suffolk expressed himself unable to distinguish it from a formal 
declaration of war ' '. '^ 

This action on the part of Sweden must have been fairly 
well considered for already in October the court of Denmark 
through its envoy in Stockholm inquired if the armed neutrality 
of 1756 ought not to be renewed. ® The King of Sweden answer- 
ed in a cordial tone that he wished once more to appeal to 
England if perchance any relief would be granted without 
adopting extreme measures. But at the same time Gustavus 
III requested his minister in Russia to find out if Russia would 
co-operate. About the end of December 1778 the Empress of 
Russia answered that she would co-operate if it became neces- 
sary. 

When the protest of Sweden failed to bring about the nec- 
essary relief from England, the King of Sweden proposed to 
Denmark and Russia that the northern powers should protect 
their commerce by entering into a convention. This action on 
the part of Sweden was well known to England for on December 
22, 1778, the British Ambassador of Petrograd wrote to the 
Earl of Suffolk regarding the contemplated action in the follow- 
ing words, "I trust your Lordship will not tax me with negli- 
gence, if the messenger is not yet departed. I cannot prevail 
on Count Panin to give me an answer, and I depend so little 
on his promise of his enabling me to despatch him to-morrow, 
that I lose no time in acquainting your Lordship, that on Satur- 
day last the Swedish Minister after enlarging greatly on our 
conduct towards neutral ships, made a formal proposal to this 
Court to join with that of Stockholm in forming a combined 
fleet, sufficiently strong to protect the trade of the north against 



^Bain, Gustavus III and Ms Contemporaries, I; 210; Fenberg, Sverigea 
Ilistoria, V, 299. 

" AlbedyhU, Recueil de memoire., 15. 



4 RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH SWEDEN 

the attacks made upon it. Mr. Nolken [the Swedish ambassador 
at Petrograd] added, that, if the Empress adopted this plan, 
there was no doubt that Denmark would also subscribe to it; 
and that the commerce of these countries, now so interrupted, 
would be by this means carried on with security". ^ The Am- 
bassador continued, "I have reasons to believe the idea of 
taking so violent a measure as that of arming an united naval 
force was immediately rejected ; but that, that of the trade of 
these countries being illegally interrupted, and the necessity of 
devising proper methods for its better security, was fully ad- 
mitted". « 

The foreign affairs of Denmark were conducted at this time 
by Andreas Peter Bernstorff sr., and his policy had always 
been hostile to Sweden. One writer states that "the insuper- 
able jealousy between Sweden and Denmark, and the disinclina- 
tion of Russia to offend England, prevented for a time, the 
formation of a Northern League".® Count Bernstorff worked 
out a plan of co-operation between Denmark and Russia ex- 
pecting to leave Sweden outside of the confederation. Russia, 
however, had not the same interest in protecting neutral com- 
merce as the two Scandinavian states, because its shipping, 
outside the Baltic, was negligible, and privateers could therefore, 
in fact, only disturb the commerce to and from Archangel; but 
this commerce was carried on mainly by the English them- 
selves. ^° 

While Russia hesitated to enter whole-heartedly into a 
convention to protect the commerce of neutral nations, Sweden 
invited other neutrals to send delegates to "a congress at Stock- 
holm in 1778" to induce Russia to head a league for arming 
the neutrals. Dr. Franklin must have known about this congress 

' Malmesbury, Diaries and Correspondence, I, 189. 

• Ibid. 189. 

'Bain, Gustavus III, and his Contemporaries, (1746-1792), I, 210. 

'* Hildebrand, Sverigea Historia, VIII, 54. 



NEGOTIATIONS DURING THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 5 

for he wrote about it to the Danish minister approving a claim 
for compensation for attending such a convention on December 
25, 1778, in the following words : " I have considered the propo- 
sition, and see no objection to it. I will write to Congress in 
favor of it, if desired". ^^ 

On December 31, 1778, the English Ambassador at Petro- 
grad again wrote about this subject to the Earl of Suffolk as 
follows: "In one of his last conversations he [Count Panin] 
told me that he was obliged to express Her Imperial Majesty's 
wishes, that we should put a little more circumspection in our 
mode of proceeding against the ships of Neutral States; that 
we should otherwise irritate powers now well disposed toward 
us; that Denmark, Sweden, and Holland had respectively solic- 
ited the Empress to join with them in a representation to us on 
this subject". " 

The northern neutrals did not stop with mere protests foi 
on February 14, 1779, the Swedish envoy at Petrograd was 
requested to make a proposal to that court, ^^ and on the 18th 
of the same month, the King of Sweden, after having reached an 
agreement with Denmark, issued a declaration according to 
which the two nations were to convoy their merchant vessels. 
About this agreement John Adams wrote to Arthur Lee : ' ' The 
declaration of the Northern Powers against the right of England 
to stop their merchant vessels and arming to support their rights 
are important events". ^* Russia had promised to help protect 
the commerce which went north of Norway, and, although Den- 
mark considered this offer unsatisfactory, Sweden, anxious to 
obtain any improvement in her relation with Russia, accepted 
whatever could be obtained for the time being. It was this con- 

" Wharton, The Revolutionary Diplomatic Corresp., I, 618. 
" Malmesbury, Diaries and Correspondence, I, 190. 
**Albedyhll, Recueil de memoire, 18. 

"Wharton, Revolutionary Diplomatic Corr., Ill, 214; Adams to Arthur 
L«e, June 9, 1779. 



6 RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH SWEDEN 

federation to which John Adams referred when he wrote to the 
President of the Continental Congress: "Russia, Sweden, and 
Denmark, comprehended under the denomination of the northern 
powers, have been thought by some to be interested in our return 
to the denomination of Great Britain. Whether they consider 
themselves in this light or not, their late declarations against the 
rights of England to interrupt their navigation and their arming 
for the protection of their commerce on the ocean, and even in 
the English channel, are unequivocal proofs of their opinion con- 
cerning the right in our contest and of their intentions not to 
interfere against us ". ^^ 

The burden of arming the convoys fell rather heavily on 
Sweden, for Russia's aid was faultering and doubtful, and Den- 
mark began to negotiate with England anew for the amelioration 
of commercial restrictions. ^® For Sweden, however, any under- 
standi)ig with Russia was preferable to the condition that pre- 
ceded the adoption of the convention; besides that she could 
render effective aid to her old friend and ally, France, in her 
endeavor to assist the young American Republic. 

The fundamental principles of the convention between 
Sweden and Denmark were repeated almost verbatim in the 
convention proclaimed by Russia on March 10, 1780. Although 
the formulation of these principles did not effect any compro- 
mise on the part of Great Britain, their formulation and en- 
forcement by an armed force of nations constituted an advance 
in the history of public law. 

Early in 1780, however, when Spain sunk two Russian mer- 
chant vessels, Russia became at once interested in a more vigor 
ous enforcement of the principles contained in the convention 
of the armed neutrality; and the Empress Catherine II, invited 
Sweden and Denmark to join with her to protect their commerce 

•••Wharton, Op. Cit., Ill, 285. 

"' Hildebrand, Sveriges Hisloria, VIII, 54. 



NEGOTIATIONS DURING THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 7 

against disturbances of hostile fleets. At this time Denmark 
was less interested in the enforcement of neutral rights than a 
year and a half earlier, for in the meantime she had entered 
into a treaty with England which would grant her most of the 
privileges she desired, but Russia finally induced Denmark to 
join. 

The following principles, quoted almost word for word 
from the earlier convention, constituted the basis of the armed 
neutrality on which Russia invited her neighbors to join with 
her: 

1. "That all neutral vessels ought to navigate freely from 

one port to another, as well as upon the coasts of the 
powers at war; 

2. ' ' That the effects belonging to the subjects of the bellig- 

erent powers shall be free in neutral ships, excepting 
always contraband goods; 

3. "That her imperial majesty, in consequence of the limits 

above fixed, will adhere strictly to that which is stipu- 
lated by the tenth and eleventh articles of her treaty 
of commerce with Great Britain, concerning the man- 
ner in which she ought to conduct herself toward all 
the belligerent powers ; 

4. ' ' That as to what concerns a port blocked up, we ought 

not, in truth, to consider as such any but those which 
are found so well shut up by a fixed and sufficient 
number of vessels belonging to the power which at- 
tacks it that one cannot attempt to enter into such 
a port without evident danger ; 

5. "That these principles alone laid down ought to serve 

as a rule in all proceedings whenever there is a question 
of legality of prizes". ^'^ 

"Wtarton, Op. Git., Ill, 608; cf. Malmesbury, Diaries and Corres 
pondence, I, 251. 



8 EELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH SWEDEN 

From the facts stated above, it becomes clear that the armed 
neutrality was in force prior to the proclamation of Catharin.3 
II, and that it originated with Sweden and Denmark rather than 
with Russia. As a matter of fact the armed neutrality of 1779- 
1780 was only a fruitition of earlier agreements to the same 
effect. If an attempt is made to find the origin of the idea, and 
the principles involved, it becomes necessary to go back into 
the close of the sixteenth century. Those agreements, far less 
known than the later one, were nevertheless effective in bringing 
about the desired end; and the honor for their establishment 
belong to Denmark and Sweden ; the first thought about it un- 
doubtedly emanated from Denmark. 

It was during the war of the allied powers against Louis 
XIV that England and Holland entered into an agreement, in 
August 1689, which united their powers under William III, to 
checkmate France. According to the first article of their agree- 
ment all commerce with France was to be prohibited. This 
treaty contradicted earlier treaties between these countries and 
the northern powers; and when the privateers began to make 
commerce dangerous the governments of Sweden and Denmark 
became uneasy. For this reason the Danish Government in- 
structed Its minister at tiie Court of Sweden to propose that 
a united force of armed vessels be fitted out to convoy their 
merchant vessels. Sweden whose polities at this time was other- 
wise hostile to Denmark, consented to the proposal and the 
result was the "Tractat till Navigationens och Commerciens 
sakerhet" (A Treaty for the Safety of Commerce and Naviga- 
tion), which was concluded at Stockholm, March 10, 1691, and 
was renewed by the Danish Minister Jens Juel, March 17, 1693. 
These are the earliest agreements of their kind and were not 
without results, for both England and Holland found themselves 



NEGOTIATIONS DURING THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 9 

obliged to make good the losses sustained by the northern 
powers. ^® 

The third league of nations to enforce the right of neutral 
commerce was brought about on July 12, 1756 by signing of a 
formal convention at Stockholm. ^^ It was later extended in 
1759 by the entrance of Russia. The existence of this union 
and the reason for it do not seem to be very well known to 
English readers, but, because this union is closely related to 
the later one, a short account of it may be included here. 

The events are intimately connected with the seven years 
war. The war which broke out in the American colonies be- 
tween France and England had not even been officially declared 
when English vessels began to visit and search all merchant 
vessels en route for France. The question of contraband be- 
came especially important, but since the treaty of peace at 
Utrecht, 1713, [parg. XIX,XX] specifically stated what was to 
be considered contraband, this question ought to have been rather 
easily solved. But the English Government made a different 
application of the rule in each instance and counted as contra- 
band many other commodities known only to their own priva- 
teers. Thus the old selfish system was in full swing. Very soon 
the effects of this system became known among the northern 
powers. Already in August 1755 England's disregard for neu- 
tral rights went so far that an English frigate, sent to the 
sound to convoy English vessels home, visited and searched a 
Swedish vessel just outside of Helsingor, under the pretense 
that it was searching for goods destined to France. This act 
was performed right under the Danish guns on Kroneborg; 

" For a summary of the agreementi see Sprinchorn, Ett bidrag till 
den vapnade neutralitetens historia i Norden in Historisk Tidskrift (188]- 
82), I, 248. For a full discussion of the earlier treaties see Reedlz, H. C. 
Danmarks og Sveriges forbindelse till de neutrala handelsrettigheters 
beskyttelse i aarene 1690 till 1693; De Skand. literatseLikapea skrifter, 21 
Bend. Copenhagen 1826. 

" AlbedyWl, Recueil de memoire, 11. 



10 RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH SWEDEN 

therefore the act aroused the indignation of the Danish Govern- 
ment, and Baron Bernstorff sr. who together with A. G. von 
Moltke controlled the politics of Denmark, instructed the Danish 
envoy at London to unite with the Swedish Minister in a protest. 
Von Moltke also suggested to the Swedish minister at Copen- 
hagen that Sweden and Denmark ought to agree on a plan to 
safeguard their shipping during the war between France and 
England. The negotiations proceeded rapidly and in February 
1856 a plan was submitted to a secret committee of the Riksdag. 
The proposition was read, discussed and approved in about half 
an hour, which fact may indicate the care with which the propo- 
sition had been prepared by the Government. After a counter 
proposition was received from Denmark, a mutual agreement was 
reached and the convention was signed July 12, 1856. ^° 

The Proclamation of Catharine II, on March 10, 1780, came 
therefore, not, as has been often assumed, as something entirely 
new and unheard of, but as an expression of the experience of 
the northern nations. -^ The principle which the earlier agree- 
ments had tested were embodied in the new one. The only ex- 
ception was the agreement of 1756 wherein Denmark objected 
to the principle of free ships, free goods, on the ground that 
she did not desire unnecessarily to offend England. 

The declaration of the northern neutrals struck at the very 
center of English interests. "In some confused minutes of a 
debate in the House of Lords on the 14 of April [1780] it is 
said that Lord Camden expressed his astonishment and regret 



"• Sprinchorn, C. Ett bidrag till den vapuade neutralitetens historia i 
Norden, in Svensk Historisk Tidskrift (1881-2), I, 250 f. 

" Mr. Bain in Gustavus III, and his contemporaries, I, 149, asserts that 
the action of Catharine II, was taken in revenge because England would not 
co-operate with her in suppressing the revolution in Sweden 1772; there- 
fore when England asked for 20,000 soldiers to restrain ' ' the increasing 
frenzy of his Majesty's unhappy and deluded people on the other side of the 
Atlantic, ' ' and a draft treaty to that effect was actually sent to Gunning, 
Catharine II explained away her promise. 



NEGOTIATIONS DURING THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION H 

at the memorial from Russia The thought of that mani- 
festo made him shudder when he first read it, particularly as he 

knew how his country stood in respect to other powers ' '.^^ 

John Adams significantly added that if the Court of England 
had had only common information "they would have known 
that this combination of maritime powers has been forming 
these eighteen months, and was nearly as well agreed to a year 
ago as it is now". " 

England did not, however, willingly accede to the principles 
of the armed neutrality for she held that Sweden was inspired 
by an excessive friendship for France and therefore also for the 
United States. The measure she adopted to counteract the armed 
neutrality seems therefore specifically aimed against Sweden. 
John Adams wrote about it to the President of Congress on April 
4, 1780, in the following words: "The Swedish frigate lUerim, 
of thirty-four guns, commanded by Captain Ankerloo, on the 
28 of February, at half after eight o'clock at night, met an 
English privateer belonging to Minorca, of twenty-eight guns. 
The Swedish captain after hailing the privateer, let her continue 
her course, and went on quietly his own : about half an hour after, 
the privateer returning ranged herself astern of the frigate 
and unexpectedly discharged both his broadsides, loaded with 
langrage, which killed three sailors, broke the thigh and right 
leg of the Captain, wounded the Lieutenant and some people 
of the crew. Ankerloo, who in the evening had been obliged by 
a violent gale of wind to draw in his guns and shut up his ports, 
not finding himself prepared for battle, his officers took immediate 
measures, with the utmost alertness, for repulsing the privateer, 
which did in fact at last receive a broadside from the frigate; 
but on the whole, she escaped in the night, by the force of sails 
and oars. After this perfidy on the part of the English, Anker- 



" Wharton, Dipl. Coir, of the Am. Rev., Ill, 632, 
='=' Wharton, Op. Cit., Ill, 676. 



12 RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH SWEDEN 

loo would have entered Marsailles for the sake of dressing his 
wounds, but having met with contrary winds and bad weather 
for three days, he put into Malaga, where he went ashore to 
the house of the Swedish consul, where he is since dead of 
wounds". " 

England even claimed the right to search merchant vessels 
under convoy. The following has been taken from a report to 
the President of Congress from John Adams dated January 
16, 1782. "They write from Stockholm, that the Court of 
London has thought proper to make representations to that of 
Sweden, concerning a recounter, which a convoy of merchant 
ships, under escort of the Swedish frigate, the Jaramas, had 
with the English squadron of commodore Stewart, who would 
have visited these ships. The Court of London pretends that he 
was authorized to make such a visit, even in virtue of the 
articles of the convention of the armed neutrality, concluded 
between the three powers of the north; but that the court of 
Stockholm, far from blaming the refusal of the captain of 
the Jaramas, to permit the visit, had highly approved his conduct, 
and answered that this officer had acted conformably to his duty, 
for that the regulation in one of the articles of the convention 
of the armed neutrality in regard to the visit of merchant ships, 
respected only vessels, which navigated without convoy, but not 
at all those which should be found under convoy, and conse- 
quently under the protection of a sovereign flag the warranty of 
the nature of their cargo, and of the property". -^ The decision 
of the Court of Sweden was referred to Catharine II, and she 
approved it and assured the Swedish Government of her co- 
operation to defend the right of neutrals. 

The Continental Congress carefully discussed the informa- 
tion received from the representatives in Europe, and on Sep- 



" Sparks, J. Dipl. Corr., II, 699 f . 

" Sparks, J. Dipl. Corr. of the Am. B»v., VI, S4t. 



NEGOTIATIONS DURING THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 13 

tember 26, 1780, a ''committee to whom was referred the motion 
of Mr. [Samuel] Adams, reports that, Whereas her Imperial 
Majesty of all the Russias, animated with the clearest sentiment 
of Justice, equity and moderation, and a strict regard to the 
unquestionable rights of neutrality and the most perfect freedom 
of commerce that can consist with such neutrality has notified 
both to the belligerent and neutral Powers, the following propo- 
sitions to which his Most Christian Majesty, the Illustrious ally 
of these United States and his Catholic Majesty two of the 
belligerent Powers, and most of the neutral Powers in Europe 
have acceded. 

"The Congress of the United States of America willing 
to testify their moderation and regard to the rights of neutrality 
and freedom of commerce, as well as their respect for the 
Powers and potentates who have adopted the propositions have : 

"Resolved, That all neutral vessels have by the Law of 
Nations a right to navigate freely to and from ports and on 
the coasts of the powers at war, when not prohibited by treaty 
or municipal law. 

' ' That in the case aforesaid the effects of belligerent Powers, 
or belonging to their subjects shall be free in neutral vessels 
except always contraband. That the term contraband be con- 
fined to those articles expressly declared such by the articles of 
the Treaty of Amity and Commerce of the 6th day of February 
1778, between his Most Christian Majesty and these United 
States. 

"That with regard to ports or places blocked up or closely 
invested, none shall be considered as such but those which by 
a seige or blockade are so closely invested that an attempt cannot 
be made to enter such ports or places without evident danger. 

"That the above principles serve as a rule in all proceed- 
ings of justice in the United States on all questions of capture. 

"Ordered that the committee of Foreign Affairs transmit 
copies of the above act to the Minister Plenipotentiary of these 



14 EELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH SWEDEN 

States at the Court of Versailles to be by him communicated to 
the Neutral Powers in Europe and others whom it may con- 
cern". ^^ 

The same day, September 26, 1780, Robert Livingston intro- 
duced a resolution of the following content : ' ' Congress have con- 
sidered the declaration of the Empress of all the Russias, rela- 
tive to the rights of neutral vessels. The regulations it contains 
are useful, wise, and just. The acts of a sovereign who pro- 
motes the happiness of her subjects and extends her views to 
the welfare of nations, who forms laws for a vast empire and 
corrects the great code of the world, claims the earliest attention 
of a rising republic therefore 

"Resolved, That the Board of Admiralty report instructions 
for the commanders of armed vessels commissioned by the Uni- 
ted States conformable to the principles contained in the said 
declaration. 

"Resolved, That copies of the above resolution be transmit- 
ted to the Minister of the United States respectively, and to 
Monssre de Marbois, charge des affaires, from his Most Christian 
Majesty"." 

On October 4 it was decided to consider the report on the 
resolution, relative to the armed neutrality of the north, on the 
following day. ^^ On the 5th, Congress took into consideration 
"the report of the committee on the motion relative to the propo- 
sition of the Empress of Russia; and thereupon came to the 
following resolution; 

"Her Imperial Majesty of all the Russias, attentive to the 
freedom of commerce, and the rights of nations, in her declara- 
tion to the belligerent and neutral powers, having proposed 
regulations, founded upon principles of justice, equity, and 



=" Journals of Cont. Congress, XVIII, 864 ff. 
-' Journals of the Cont. Congress, XVIII, 866. 
-* Journals of the Cont. Congress, XVIII, 899. 



NEGOTIATIONS DURING THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 15 

moderation, of which their Most Christian and Catholic Majes- 
ties, and most of the neutral maritime powers of Europe, have 
declared their approbation. 

"Congress, willing to testify their regard to the rights of 
commerce, and their respect for the sovereign, who hath pro- 
posed and the powers that have approved the said regulations ; 

"Resolved, That the Board of Admiralty prepare and re 
port instructions for the commanders of armed vessels com- 
missioned by the United States, conformable to the principles 
contained in the declaration of the Empress of all the Russias, 
on the rights of neutral vessels ; 

' ' That the ministers plenipotentiary from the United States, 
if invited thereto, be and hereby are respectively empowered 
to accede to such regulations conformable to the spirit of the said 
declaration, as may be agreed upon by Congress expected to 
assemble in pursuance of the invitation of her Imperial Majesty. 

"Ordered, That copies of the above resolutions be trans- 
mitted to the respective ministers of the United States at for- 
eign courts, and to the honorable the minister plenipotentiary 
of France". '« 

The Board of Admiralty reported November 27, 1780, giving 
the following instructions to the commanders of ships of war 
and private armed vessels : 

1. "Permit all neutral vessels freely to navigate in the 

high seas or coasts of America, except such as are 
employed in carrying contraband goods or soldiers to 
the enemies of the United States ; 

2. "You shall not seize or capture any effects belonging to 

the subjects of belligerent powers on board neutral 
vessels, excepting contraband goods". 

3. The term "contraband" should be interpreted in the 

light of the treaty of February 6, 1778, with France. 

^ Journals of the Continental Congress, XVIII, 905 f . 



16 RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH SWEDEN 

4. Any one who violated those regulations should lose his 

commission. 

5. These principles should serve as basis for determining 

the legality of prizes. ^° 

In keeping with these instructions, Congress adopted a reso- 
lution June 26, 1781, to request the Board of Admiralty to "in- 
form John Barry Esq., commander of the frigate Alliance that 
Congress approve his conduct in releasing the ship belonging to 
subjects of the republic of Venice, retaken by him from a British 
privateer on the 4th of March last, it being their determination 
always to pay the utmost respect to the rights of neutral com- 
merce" " 

The ministers plenipotentiary who represented the United 
States in Europe performed their part expeditiously. John 
Adams wrote to the President of Congress March 19, 1781, "1 
have been advised to do nothing in consequence of my commis- 
sion to the States at present, for fear of throwing before the 
people new objects of division and dissension. I have, however, 
communicated to their High Mightinesses and to the ministers of 
Russia, Denmark, Sweden, and France, the resolution of Congress 
of the 5th of October, relative to the principles of the neutral 

confederation ". " And Dr. Franklin wrote to John Jay 

on April 12, 1781, "I thank you for sending me the copy of the 
Resolution relating to the Empress of Russia, tho' I had before 
received it, and was already communicated to her Imperial 
Majesty, who I am informed is much pleased with it". " 

Congress also issued instructions to Mr. Dana, December 
19, 1780, when he was sent to Russia authorizing him to "sub 
scribe to any treaty for that purpose ' ' of protecting the freedom 

••Journals of the Cont. Congress, XVIII, 1097; comp. 1008. 
" Journals of the Cont. Congress, XVIII, 1098 ; Journals of Congresa, 
VII, 109. 

"John Adams' Works (ed. C. F. Adams), VII, 381. 
=^Life and Writings of Franklin (ed. Smyth), VIII, 238. 



NEGOTIATIONS DURING THE AMERICAN REA^OLUTION 17 

of commerce and the rights of nations "conformable to the 
spirit" of the declaration, "and which is consistant with the 
dignity and sovereignty of the United States as a free and inde- 
pendent nation ". He was authorized to sign a treaty 

with any one of the neutral nations or with all of them, and to 
"use every means which can be devised to obtain the consent 
and influence of that Court that these United States shall be 
formally invited, or admitted to accede as principal and as inde- 
pendent nation to the said convention". ^* 

In a letter to Livingston, dated September 5, 1782, Francis 
Dana pointed out that Congress must ' ' have misapprehended the 
nature of the Confederation proposed to maintain the freedom 
of comm.erce and navigation My commission and in- 
structions are in part founded upon the supposition" that neu- 
trals and belligerents alike were invited "to enter into a general 
convention for that purpose, and authorized me to accede to 
the same (if invited thereto) on the part of the United States, 
whereas the declaration is in the nature of a notification to the 
belligerent powers only, and contains a complaint of the inter- 
ruption the commerce and navigation of neutral nations. . . . 
had suffered from the subjects of the belligerent powers, in viola- 
tion of the rights of neutral nations". The proclamation stated 
those rights and to protect them the neutrals had fitted out the 
greater portion of their marine forces. "^ 

Mr. Dana continued by saying that this was the only passage 
he had "been able to find in all the acts relative to this subject 
which gives the least idea of a Congress for general negotia- 
tion". ^« 

On January 3, 1783, Mr. Dana explained that the maritime 



^Journals of the Cont. Congress, XVIII, 1168-73. 
^ Wharton, Dipl. Corr. of the Am. Rev., V, 700 ff. 
»^ Wharton, Dipl. Corr. of the Am. Rev., V, 700. 



18 RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH SWEDEN 

convention appeared ' ' from its nature, as well as from its terms, 
to be limited to the duration of the present war". " 

From the evidence at hand it seems fair to conclude that 
Russia did not mean to help the United States to establish their 
independence; she entered the armed neutrality for her own 
interest. Catharine II enjoyed the flattery and praise the reso- 
lution of the Continental Congress bestowed upon her, but she 
stubbornly refused to receive their minister. The French min- 
ister to the United States received a despatch from Count d«! 
Vergennes, dated March 9, 1781, of which he notified congress. 
Count de Vergennes considered "that the resolves of Congress 
which had been adopted on the association of the neutral powers, 
were found very wise by the council of the king; and that it 
was thought they might be of service in the course of the nego- 
tiations. The French ministry did not doubt tliat they would be 
very agreeable to the Empress of Russia. But they were not 
of the same opinion with the respect to the appointment of Mr. 
Dana, as a minister to the court of Petersburg". The reason was 
that the Empress had expressed the greatest impartiality and 
expected that peace would be established only through her med- 
iation. ^^ 

This question is further illustrated by a letter which Dr. 
Franklin received from Francis Dana, and which Dr. Franklin 
reported to Congress. He wrote: "This day I received a letter 
from Mr. Dana, dated at St. Petersburg, April 29, in which is 
the following passage : We yesterday received news, that thb 
States General had on the 19th of this month acknowledged the 
Independence of the United States. This event gave a shock here, 
and is not well received, as they at least profess to have flattered 
themselves, that the mediation would have prevented it, and 



"Wharton, Dip. Corr. of the Am. Rev., VI, 194; Sparks, Dipl. Coir. 
IV, 664. 

^Journals of the Cont. Congress, XX, 562. 



NEGOTIATIONS DURING THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 19 

otherwise bro't on a partial peace between Great Britain and 
Holland ".^« 

In view of these facts it is not surprising that Hamilton 
made a motion in Congress, seconded 'by Madison on May 21, 
1783, "that Dana be informed that the primary object of his 
mission to St. Petersburg was terminated, and that the benefits 
of a commercial treaty were remote and without present induce- 
ments". Mr. Hamilton also referred to the armed neutrality 
in the following words : ' ' That though Congress approve the 
principles of the armed neutrality, founded on the liberal basis of 
a maintenance of the rights of neutral nations of the privileges 
of commerce, yet they are unwilling, at this juncture, to become 
a party to a confederacy which may hereafter too far compli- 
cate the interests of the United States with the politicks of 
Europe, and therefore, if such a progress is not yet made in 
this business as may make it dishonorable to recede, it is 
their desire, that no further measures may be taken at present 
towards the admission of the United States into that confeder- 
acy". *" 

From these facts it is clear that the policy of Russia was 
only tb weaken both England and France so that she should 
be able so much more easily to pursue her policy toward Poland 
for its final partition. In the weakened condition, France would 
not be able to watch so carefully the Russian advances into 
Poland. Denmark was her ally and came into the armed neu- 
trality under the pressure of Russia, because she had entered 
into a treaty with England v/hich gave her partial satisfaction. 
Sweden, therefore, remains as the only member of the armed 
neutrality which on account of its friendship with France and 
the United States was willing to aid the friends. This is strik- 



^ Life and Writings of Franklin, VIII, 534. 

^Journals of Congress, For. Affrs., 346; also in Writings of James 
Madison (G. Hunt, ed.), I, 469. 



20 RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH SWEDEN 

ingly illustrated by the fact that Sweden was the first country 
to request a treaty with the "United States, by the treatment of 
the American ministers by the Swedish ministers in Europe, and 
by their offer to grant United States vessels a haven of safety in 
the harbors of their country. 

On December 20, 1781, Mr. Carmichael wrote to Robert 
Livingston from Madrid : ' ' The new minister of Sweden is open 
in declaring his partiality for our cause, and signified that 
he would have waited on Mr. Jay on his arrival here, as it is the 

custom of those last come to do His conduct to myself 

shows that this was not a mere compliment, for he has invited 
me several times to dine with him, and visited me". *^ In a 
similar spirit John Adams wrote from the Hague, September 4, 
1782: "The minister from Sweden, the Baron d'Ehrenswerd, is 
lately removed to Berlin, to my great regret, as he appeared to 
me a very good character, and behaved very civilly to me several 
times when I met him at court and at the French ambassa- 
dor's". *^ Again John Adams wrote on November 19, 1782: 
"The Swedish minister went to a gentleman and asked him to 
introduce him to Mr. Jay and me, which he did. The minister 
told us he had been here since 1766 ' '. *' 

Dr. Franklin reported on July 1, 1782, that "the ambassador 
from the King of Sweden ' ' had asked him whether he had powers 
to conclude a treaty of commerce with Sweden. The minister 
said that his master "was desirous of such a treaty with the 
United States", and had directed him to ask Dr. Franklin 
that question. The King had charged his minister to tell Frank- 
lin "that it would flatter him greatly to make it with a person 
v/hose character he so much esteemed ". ** 

Regarding the treaty Franklin wrote to Livingston on 

" Wharton, Dip]. Corr. of the Am. Rev., V. 62. 
*= Wharton. Dipl. Corr. of the Am. Rev., V, 691 
*> Wharton, Dipl. Corr. of the Am. Rev., VI, 56. 
« Wharton, Op. Cit., V, 558. 



NEGOTIATIONS DURING THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 21 

August 12, 1782, in the following words: "I understand from 
the Swedish Ambassador that their treaty with us will go on 
as soon as ours with Holland is finished, and the treaty with 
France with such improvements as that with Holland may 
suggest, being the basis".*' The continental congress adopted 
a resolution September 19, 1782 : * * That a commission and in- 
structions" should be issued "for negotiating a treaty of amity 
and commerce with the King of Sweden". Arthur Lee, Ralph 
Izard, and James Duane were appointed as a committee to draft 
the instructions. *® The committee was ready to report a plan 
for a treaty and instructions on September 28, 1782. The com- 
mission was issued to Franklin and in case of his death or incap- 
acity to John Adams. *^ The instructions were issued to Frank- 
lin "to negotiate and conclude the proposed treaty of amity and 
commerce with the person or persons that shall be appointed 
by his Swedish Majesty at Paris, and not elsewhere, unless some 
other place should be fixed upon for negotiating a general peace ; 
in which case you may negotiate and conclude it at the same 
place". The Committee suggested that the treaty should run 
for twelve years only " as we shall be better able to judge by 
experience what commercial regulations will be most beneficial 
for the citizens and subjects of the contracting Powers". 

The instructions continued by saying that "it is possible 
that the fourth article in the plan of a treaty may be objected to 
on the part of the King of Sweden, as unequal, he having more 
ships of war than the United States, and not being engaged in 
any war which may render protection necessary to the ships of 
his subjects. He may also apprehend, that the giving protection 
to our vessels may involve him in war with Great Britain. To 
this it may be answered that the fifteenth article is as unequal 
in favor of Sweden, giving her the benefit of the carrying trade, 

* Wharton, Dipl. Corr. of the Am. Rev., V, 655. 
*« Journals of the Cont. Congress, XXIII, 592, 610. 
" Journals of the Cont. Congress, XXIII, 621. 



22 RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH SWEDEN 

which cannot be enjoyed by the citizens of the United States . . . 
Therefore the one article may be set against the other." 

The essential object of the treaty was declared to be "the 
recognition of our Independence by another European power." 
In order to obtain that Franklin was authorized, if necessary, 
not to adhere to the fourth article ' ' to prevent the conclusion of 
the treaty. ' ' On the same principle he was authorized to use his 
discretion in extending the terms of the treaty to twenty years 
but no farther. He was also allowed to "recede from the stipula- 
tion proposed in the 9th article, that whatever shall be found 
laden by the Subjects and Inhabitants of either party on any ship 
belonging to the enemies of the other should be subject to confisca- 
tion. ' ' *** During the debates Congress changed the time for the 
duration of the treaty to fifteen years instead of twelve as sug- 
gested by the committee. *^ 

The American ministers in Europe a;lso considered that an 
important victory had been won through the invitation from 
Sweden to form a treaty. On December 14, 1782, John Adams 
wrote to Robert Livingston from Paris: "There is more matter 
than time to write at present. The King of Sweden has done the 
United States the great honor in his commission to his Minister 
to treat with them, by inserting that he had a great desire to form 
a connection with States which had so fully established their 
independence, and by their wise and gallant conduct so well de- 
served it ; and his Minister desired it might be remembered that 
his Sovereign w^as the first who had voluntarily proposed a 
treaty with us. ' ' ^° Only ten days later Franklin could write : 
"The Swedish ambassador has exchanged full powers with me. 
I send a copy of his herewith. "We have had some conferences on 
the proposed plan of our treaty, and he has despatched a courier 
for further instructions respecting some of the articles. ' ' ^^ 

"' Journals of the Cont. Congress, XXIII, 622-24. 
*» Writings of James Madison (G. Hunt, ed.), I, 243. 
"» Sparks, Dipl. Corr., IV, 3. 
=' Wharton, Dip]. Corr. of the Am. Rev., VI, 163. 



NEGOTIATIONS DURING THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 23 

The work on the treaty progressed so rapidly that it could 
be signed on April 3, 1783. Shortly after the treaty was signed 
Count Gustavus Philip Creutz, who for seventeen years had been 
Minister at the Court of Versailles, was recalled to succeed Count 
Shaffer as secretary of Foreign Affairs. As his successor at Paris 
was chosen the young Baron Eric Magnus de Stael von Holstein, 
son-in-law of M. Necker, the French minister of finance. ^^ 

The treaty proper contained twenty-seven articles of which 
the first one provided for a ''firm and universal peace" between 
the United States and Sweden. The treaty provided that if one 
country granted any commercial privilege to any other nation 
in regard to tariff or harbor facilities that privilege should also 
apply to the commerce between the two contracting parties. The 
principle of free ships, free goods, excluding contraband, was 
incorporated from the armed neutrality. In one article the 
treaty specified that contraband should include material of war, 
like arms, great guns, canon balls, and even matches. But con- 
traband goods destined to an enemy country should not be con- 
fiscated outright until legal investigation had been completed in 
order to grant justice to the parties concerned. No privateer 
of either nation was allowed to take prizes from the other, but 
if a prize had been taken the person who had taken the prize 
was responsible in person and goods to make satisfaction to the 
injured party. In order that the government should be able to 
guarantee this last point, it should require from every person 
who wished to fit out a privateer a security so large that the 
treaty obligations could be fulfilled. If one nation should be at 
war and his enemy had taken vessels from its friendly ally, this 
one, if he retook the vessel, should return it to its lawful owner. 

The treaty also prescribed the details to be followed if the 
two countries should be at war with a common enemy. The fol- 
lowing procedure should be carried out: 

" Bain, Gustavus III, etc., I, 254. 



24 RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH SWEDEN 

1. If the vessel was retaken from the enemy by a man of 

war from the other nation, and the vessel had not been 
in the possession of the enemy more than 24 hours, 
then it should be returned to the original owner on 
paying one-third of the value of the ship and cargo ; if 
the vessel should have been in possession of the enemy 
more than 24 hours, it should belong to the captor. 

2. If the vessel was retaken during the 24 hours, it should 

be returned to the owner on paying one-thirtieth of 
the value of the vessel and cargo, and one-tenth if re- 
taken after 24 hours, for the crew of the capturing 
vessel. 

3. Prizes taken in the above manner should be returned to 

the owner after he had given security to assure the 
carrying out of the above stipulation. 

4. Privateers of one nation shall be admitted into the har- 

bors of the other reciprocally. 

The twenty-seventh article suggested that the treaty should 
be ratified within eight months, or sooner if possible, counting 
from the day of the signature. ^^ 

On July 29, 1783, Congress took up the treaty for considera- 
tion and with a few verbal changes it was ' ' adopted and ratified 
by nine states being present." Congress thereupon authorized 
Benjamin Franklin "to deliver this our act of ratification in ex- 
change for the ratification of the said treaty by his Majesty the 
King of Sweden. ' ' The act was signed by the President of Con- 
gress, Elias Boudinot on July 29, 1783, and of our sovereignty 
and independence the eight ' '. ^* 

A committee consisting of James Madison, ]\Ir. Higginson, 



"Journal of the Am. Cong. (1774-1788), IV, 241 f., Malloy, Treaties, 
Conventions, and International Acts, II, 1725 ff., Secret Journal of Con- 
gress, III, 369. 

"Journal of the American Congress (1774-1788), IV, 247. 



NEGOTIATIONS DUEING THE AMERICAN BEVOLUTION 25 

and Alexander Hamilton was appointed to draught a proclama- 
tion declaring the treaty in force, and the report was submitted 
and adopted on September 5, 1783. The proclamation required 
all the citizens and inhabitants, and "more especially all officers 
and others in the service of the United States" to govern them- 
selves ' ' strictly in all things according to the stipulations ' ' of the 
treaty. ^° 

'''Journal of the American Congress (1774-1788), IV, 278. 



CHAPTER II 

Proposed Alliance 

"It appears that no powers are at present vested in any 
person in Europe to agree to any treaty similar to that entered 
into by Russia, Sweden, Denmark and the United Provinces of 
the Netherlands, after the peace shall be concluded ' ', wrote Rob- 
ert Livingston on June 3, 1783, in a report to Congress. ^ Nine 
days later a committee of Congress took up the idea and said: 
"The resolution of the 5th of October, 1780, empowers the Min- 
isters of these States, if invited thereto, to accede to such regula- 
tions conformable to the spirit of the declaration of Russia. . . . 
in pursuance of the invitation of her Imperial Majesty. Our 
Ministers received no invitation, and special powers were after- 
wards given to Mr. Dana, which, in their nature superceded that 
resolution. Mr. Dana was by his commission and instructions, 
empowered to sign the treaty, or convention, for the protection of 
commerce, in behalf of the United States, either with her Im- 
perial Majesty in conjunction with other neutral Powers, or, if 
that shall be inadmissible, separately with her Imperial Majesty, 
or any of those, that is, those neutral Powers. The treaty being 
only made to continue during the war, his powers terminated 
with the war, or at most extended only to sign it with neutral 
Powers, and not to form a new separate treaty". Thereupon 
Congress adopted the following resolution: "Whereas, the pri- 
mary object of the resolution of October 5, 1780, and of the com- 
mission and instructions to Mr. Dana relative to the accession of 
the United States to the neutral Confederacy, no longer can 

• Wharton, Dip. Corr. of the Am. Rev., VI, 473. 



PROPOSED ALLIANCE 27 

operate .... But inasmuch as the liberal principles on which 
the said confederacy was established are conceived to be, in gen- 
eral, favorable to the interests of nations, and particularly to 
those of the United States .... 

' ' Resolved, That the Ministers Plenipotentiary of these Unit- 
ed States for negotiating a peace be, and they are hereby, in- 
structed, in case they should comprise in the definitive treaty 
any stipulation amounting to a recognition of the rights of neu- 
tral nations, to avoid accompanying them by any engagements 
which shall oblige the contracting parties to support those stipu- 
lations by arms ' '. ^ 

From this resolution it appears that Congress was still warm- 
ly attached to the principles of the armed neutrality, although 
it seems that no representative of the United States was ever 
invited to sign a convention with any neutral nation incorporat- 
ing them. But it is equally clear that Congress was anxious to 
avoid being implicated in the dynastic quarrels of European 
affairs. 

The question was soon presented to the American representa- 
tives in Europe. John Adams wrote to Robert Livingston on 
July 7, 1783, less than a month after the above resolution had 
been adopted : ' ' The Dutch ambassadors did once propose a meet- 
ing to us, and had it at my house. Dr. Franklin came, but Mr. 
Jay did not, and Mr. Laurens was absent. The ambassadors de- 
sired to know whether we had power to enter into any engage- 
ments, provided France, Spain, and Holland should agree to any, 
in support of the armed neutrality. We showed them the reso- 
lution of Congress of the 5 of October, 1780, and told them that 
Mr. Dana had been since vested with a particular commission to 
the same effect. We never lieard anything further about it". ^ 

Thus the American revolutionary^ war ended without the 



' Sparks, Dip. Corr., V, 500 ff. 
Sparks, Dip. Corr., TV, 45. 



28 RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH SWEDEN 

principles of the armed neutrality having gained common recog- 
nition or become a part of international treaties except in rare 
cases. Apparently there seemed to be no specific need for adopt- 
ing those principles after peace had once more been established. 
But the peace was not to endure very long for the revolutionary 
movements in France soon began to attract the attention of Eu- 
rope, and developed so fast that on January 21, 1793, Louis 
XVI, perished by the guillotine. Only eleven days later France 
declared war on Great Britain and Holland. The progress of the 
French devolution was followed with a great deal of interest 
both in the United States and Europe, and the old principles of 
the armed neutrality were again brought forth to protect the 
position of neutrals. 

Gustavus III of Sweden planned to place himself at the head 
of a coalition against the revolutionary element in France in 
order to force them to re-establish the King on the throne. Spain, 
Russia, and Prussia were to co-operate with him, but the King of 
Sweden was to be the leader of the expedition. Spain, though 
interested, did not seem to have the courage of her conviction, 
and Catharine II, busy with her plans in Poland, was glad to see 
her neighbor absorbed in other directions and therefore tacitly 
consented to the plan without granting any effective assistance, 
The Swedish Ambassador Baron E. M. Stael von Holstein, who 
had represented his country at Paris since 1783, was recalled in 
December, 1791, and ordered not to return to Sweden because 
he had "become faithful to the French system".* But the 
assassination of Gustavus III quickly made a change in the en- 
tire alignment of nations. 

One of the results of this change was that Dumaureiz decided 
to recall the French charge d 'affairs in Stockholm, M. Gaussen, 
and "replaced him with a citizen who was completely in sym- 



* S. J. Boethius, Gustaf IV, Adolf foimyndareregering och franska 
revoliitionen, in Svensk Historisk Tidskrift (1887-8), VII- VIII, 109. 



PROPOSED ALLIANCE 29 

pathy with the Revolution and not neglect to reap advantage 
of" what was called "the memorable catastrophe which in Swe- 
den seemed to give a new turn to the administration".' Both 
the new French ambassador, Verninac, and Baron Stael had a 
new convention between the two countries much at heart. Baron 
Stael, contrary to orders from home, went to Sweden, and, 
through the aid of a friend Baron Karl Goran Bonde, succeeded 
in gaining access to the Prince Regent and v/on his personal 
favor. ® The news that France had conquered the Austrian 
Netherlands and the retreat of Prussia before Verninac started 
for Sweden, must have influenced the Swedish administration to 
a verj^ large degree in its attitude toward France. Before the 
end of November, 1792, therefore, we find Baron Stael von Hol- 
stein started upon a diplomatic journey which had been agreed 
upon between the Prince Regent and M. Verninac '' to form a 
commercial treaty between the two countries. The plan was 
even enlarged so as to permit Denmark and Turkey to enter into 
it. But the war rolled on absorbing nation after nation in its 
currents. 

Sweden, desirous of being neutral, decided to invite its 
neighbors to renew the armed neutrality, not without suggestions 
from France. Catharine II of Russia, having received England's 
sanction on the second partition of Poland, entered into an agree- 
ment with England on March 25, 1793, to renounce her former 
principles in regard to neutral commerce. She demanded that 
Sweden should follow her example, and when the Prince Regent 
refused she took that as an excuse for discontinuing her subsidies 
to Sweden, according to the Drottningholm declaration of 1791. ^ 

' The correspondence is quoted by S. J. Boethius, Gustaf IV, Adolfs 
formyndareregering och franska revolutionen, in Svensk Historisk Tidskrift 
(1887-8), VII-VIII, 100 ff. 

-Ibid. 110. 

' Ibid. 178. 

"S. J. Boethius, Gustaf TV Adolfs formyndareregering och franska 
revolutionen, in Svensk Historisk Tidskrift (1S87-8), VII-VIII, 207; Hildc- 
hrand, Sveriges Historia VIII, 206. 



30 RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH SWEDEN 

The mission of Baron Stael was so successful that he already 
in the spring of 1793 sent home a convention for the ratification 
of his home government. The French ambassador seemed cer- 
tain that the convention should be ratified by the Swedish Gov- 
ernment instantly, but on July 29, 1793, he was obliged to notify 
the French Government that the Prince Regent had not sent the 
expected courier with his ratification but instead an ordinary 
letter with some objections to the convention. The following are 
the main objections as stated by Verninac: 1) a few changes of 
which the principal one was that the "King of Sweden" is not 
mentioned enough, but the Swedish nation was mentioned in hL-^. 
place; 2) if France shortly after the signing of the convention 
insisted on the stipulated assistance, Sweden would be deprived 
of an essential part of her power, and become powerless against 
Russia whose men-of-war already had entered the Baltic [France 
was to assist Sweden — in case she should be forced into war on 
account of the treaty — with 12,000 men infantry, 15 battleships, 
and 10 frigates ; Sweden was to assist France with 8,000 men 
infantry, 10 battleships, and 6 frigates]. Therefore the Prince 
Regent insisted as a sine qua non upon a specific declaration that 
the Swedish troops should not be called farther away than they 
could come to her defense; and 3) the introduction did not suffi- 
ciently specify the fundamental principles on which the treaty 
was based. ^ The French Government neglected to take up the 
suggestions of the Government of Sweden and therefore the de 
fensive alliance of May 17, 1793, failed to be ratified, not on 
account of the Prince Regent, but on account of "the abstract 
revolutionary doctrines" whose principles were essentially oppos- 
ed to the Swedish alliance. Robespierre had in the meantime re- 
placed Danton both in the committee of public safety and in the 
committee on foreign affairs. ^° 

'' S. J. Boethius, Gustaf IV, Adolfs foimyndareregering och franska 
revolutionen, in Svensk Historisk Tidskrift (1887-8), VII-VIIT, 210. 
^o Ibid. 215. 



PROPOSED ALLIANCE 31 

When this treaty failed the energetic Baron Stael advised 
that a new treaty should be prepared on the basis of the prin- 
ciples of the armed neutrality of 1780. This suggestion was sec- 
onded by M. Verninac who was authorized to enter into negotia- 
tions in this regard. In the introduction to this treaty it was 
stated that "The French Republic and the King of Sweden de- 
sired to renew the almost two-century-long friendship between 
the two peoples and energetically resist the domination of the 
allied powers over the neutrals". The following principles were 
included : 

1. Sweden should resist all attempts of foreign powers to 

hinder the exercise of its rights to pursue its commerce 
in all commodities [Russia had already requested Swe- 
den to notify France that no French ships could enter 
a Swedish port] ; 

2. Sweden should protect its commerce by battleships; 

3. Swedish merchant vessels should pay the same duty in 

France as French vessels ; 

4. France should remunerate Sweden for every battleship 

and frigate she armed for the protection of her com- 
merce [Deforgues suggested in a letter that France 
would pay 500,000 and 300,000 francs respectively] ; 

5. If the treaty should involve Sweden in war with Russia, 

France promised financial aid; 

6. In order to aid Sweden in the first preparations, France 

promised, besides the subsidies, to pay a certain sum. 
of money when the treaty was signed, but the amount 
was not specified ; 

7. Sweden should not export any foodstuffs to enemies of 

the Republic so long as they persisted in taking neutral 
ships destined to France; 

8. No foreign merchant should be allowed to accumulate 

and store foodstuffs to be shipped to enemies of France ; 



32 RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH SWEDEN 

9. French privateers should be allowed freely to sell their 
prizes in Sweden. ^^ 

Baron Stael promised to inform his government of the treaty, 
but he raised some objections to it : there were expressions in the 
introduction, regarding the allied governments, which were too 
much of a challenge to these powers ; that article 9, about the 
exports of foodstuffs, should cause a great deal of dissatisfaction 
in Sweden ; that the amounts for battleships and frigates be speci- 
fied at 500,000 and 300,000 1. respectively ; that ten million 1. be 
decided on to be paid out when the treaty was signed, but Verni " 
nac succeeded in reducing it to six million; finally Baron Stael 
requested that Sweden should be remunerated for convoys already 
fitted out. ^2 

On October 9, the committee on Public Safety finally took 
up the remarks of Ambasador Stael for consideration and decided 
that no change should be made in the introduction ; that convoys 
should be remunerated by 500,000 and 300,000 respectively ; that 
six millions should be paid when the treaty was signed. On 
October 12, Deforgues wrote to Verninac that the committee re- 
fused to change article 9. Verninac 's despatch, dated Novem- 
ber 15, stated that the Prince Regent approved the treaty except 
article 9, "because it would entirely destroy the commerce of 
Sweden and also make him appear inconsistent before all Eu- 
rope ' '. 

The Prince Regent was, in fact, very well pleased with the 
turn of events in regard to France. Besides, the relation with 
Denmark had developed in a manner that suited the treaty of neu- 
trality. During the last days of August or first days of Septem- 
ber, he sent an envoy to Copenhagen to continue the work started 



" S. J. Boethius, Gustaf IV, Adolfs formyndareregering och franska 
revolutionen. in Svensk Historisk Tidskrift (1887-8), VII, VIII, 216. 
^- S. J. Boethius, Op. Git., VII -VIII, 218. 



PROPOSED ALLIANCE 33 

by Baron Stael on his journey to France. " But even this alli- 
ance with France came to naught. 

It has been considered necessary to give a discussion on the 
relation of Sweden with certain European nations in order to 
obtain the proper angle from which to view the relations with 
the United States. It must further be remembered that the 
United States and Sweden had not as yet exchanged public niin 
isters and therefore their relations were carried on through rep- 
resentatives of the two countries who met in some other European 
capital, or by similar indirect means. 

Xeither Yerninac nor Stael could console themselves with 
thp failure of the treaty of 1793 and therefore they proceeded 
euergetically each in his own way to discover some other plan. 
Yerninac proposed to the Committee on Public Safety that a 
secret agreement should be made between France and Sweden, 
and that Sweden should be requested to send out eight ships of 
the line and four frigates in May, 1794, or earlier; and that nego- 
tiations should be started with Sweden, Denmark, Turkey, Po- 
land, Yenice, Genoa, and the United States to form "a league 
and receive subsidies or commercial advantages" from France. 
Sweden and Denmark should be considered as allies of France 
and they should each receive 6 million 1. when the convention 
would be eigned and 500,000 1. for every ship of the line and 
300,000 1. for each frigate. ^^ 

Baron Stael, on the other hand, was recalled when he failed 
to make a satisfactory treaty with France. On his way to Swe- 
den he stopped at Copenhagen where he was preceded by another 

Swedish envoy Baron E . There he worked energetically to 

obtain a new treaty of armed neutrality with Denmark. The 
Prince Regent was rather reluctant in giving him the necessary 



" S. J. Boethius, Op. Cit., VII-VIII, 220. 

"Quoted by S. J. Boethius, in Svensk Higtorisk Tidskrift (1887-8), 
VII-VIII, 224. 



H4 RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH SWEDEN 

authority but finally he wrote that Stael's arguments "weighed 
so heavily ' ' that the Prince Eegent through a letter from Sparre, 
the chancellor, dated March 31, authorized Stael, "if it was con- 
sidered necessary" to sign a convention without further instruc- 
tions. Accordingly the convention was signed in Copenhagen 
on March 27, 1794. " With this treaty Stael set out for Sweden, 
and both countries shortly afterward ratified it. 

Baron Stael did not, however, long remain in Sweden, but 
returned to France, ostensibly on account of the death of his 
mother-in-law, but really to attempt to receive the French sub- 
sidies promised in reward for the armed neutrality. On his way 
he stopped in Copenhagen, partly because of a temporary ill- 
ness, and partly to await authorization from the Prince Regent 
to recognize the Republic and the appointment as ambassador 
to France, which powers he proposed to use in order to influence 
the French authorities. On January 9, 1795, he arrived at Basel, 
where he met SigneuP^ who brought good news from Paris. Sig- 
neul thought that the authorities at Paris would be willing to 
reward Sweden for her expenses in connection with the armed 
neutrality. Baron Stael, encouraged by the information he re- 
ceived concerning the general political conditions, hastened to 
Paris, ^" and also urged his home government to increase the 
convoys in lieu of French aid. 

The Prince Regent did not, however, authorize the recogni- 
tion of the French Republic until after the subsidy convention 
had been signed ; but the Swedish Government did approach the 
Government of Denmark with the proposal to increase the con- 
voys. The Danish Government was not inclined to accept this 



''See S. J. Boethius, in Svensk Historisk Tidskrift (1887-8), VII-VIII, 
226. 

" Signeul was the Swedish courier who carried many of these documents 
from Stael to Sweden. 

" S. J. Boethius discusses this question fully, in Svensk Historifk Tid- 
skrift (1889-90), IX-X, 5 ff. 



PROPOSED ALLIANCE , ?.". 

proposal. The Danish Prime Minister even went so far as to 
inform the Swedish envoy at his Court that the propositions of 
Sweden were occasioned bj^ the necessity to support its recogni- 
tion of the French Republic and therefore of no concern to 
Denmark. The result of this interview was that the Swedish 
chancellor in a letter to Stael "renewed, but not in any way 
changed" his instructions; and the Prince Regent wrote to the 
Danish Crown Prince on April 27, requesting a more energetic 
participation in the armed neutrality. 

It seems that this letter had the desired effect for the Prince 
Regent, with the Swedish Crown Prince on May 19, went to 
Skane with a view to meet the Danish Crov;n Prince to strength- 
en the union by a personal interview. Shortly before the royal 
party started from Stockholm a notice was received that Den- 
mark had decided to enter more energetically into the partici- 
pation in the armed neutrality. Bernstorff even tried to ex- 
plain away his statement to the Swedish envoy. ^^ 

Not until September 14, 1795, did Baron Stael succeed in 
bringing his negotiations in Paris to a close. The result was the 
establishment of a "secret and preliminary" convention which 
contained the following provisions : 

1. In view of a definitive treaty of commerce and alliance, 

Sweden agreed to fit out 10 ships of the line and 5 
frigates ; 

2. When this fleet set out, Sweden should notify England 

and other powers hostile to the Republic that she had 
decided to enforce her neutral rights ; 

3. Sweden should demand immediate reparation or remun- 

eration from Eng-land for vessels and cargoes taken; 

4. If Sweden, on account of this demand or on account of 

retaliatory measures, should be involved in war with 

"Quoted by S. J. Boethius in Sveiisk Historisk Tidskrift (1889-90), 
TX-X, 14, 23. 



36 RELATIONS OF THE IJKITED STATES WITH SWEDEN 

England, Russia, or any other power, France would 
pay Sweden 400,000 1. for every ship of the line and 
200,000 1. for each frigate; 

5. France should give to Sweden one-tenth of the value of 

the cargoes v.'hich she could retake for France; 

6. These cargoes should immediately with the deduction 

of one-tenth be given to France or their French own- 
ers; 

7. Sweden should with all her might and in co-operation 

with France and Holland exert her influence upon 
Denmark to participate in the freedom of the seas ; 

8. On account of the cost of arming her convoys which 

Sweden ever since the beginning of the war had made 
in order to maintain her neutrality, and to prove her 
interest and friendship, France should pay Sweden 
ten million 1. namely four million when the convention 
was ratified and one million every six months from 
January 1, 1796, until the whole sum was paid; 

9. If Sweden and France were drawn into a common war, 

neither one should have a separate peace. ^^ 
The convention of September 14, 1795, was only prelim- 
inary and should be exchanged as soon as possible for a defin- 
itive treaty of commerce and defensive alliance for which the 
treaties of 1741, 1781, and 1787 should serve as types. The con- 
vention between Sweden, Denmark and France should be en- 
larged to a confederation of all the neutrals so as to include 
Prussia, Holland, Spain, Portugal, United States, and Venice. ^" 



"Quoted by S. J. Boethius, in Svensk Historisk Tidskrift (1889-90), 
IX-X, 37: This time the Prince Regent became fairly well satisfied and on 
October 2, the chancellor, Sparre, notified Baron Stael of the ratification, 
but France never sent the counter ratification of the convention of Sep- 
tember 14. 1795. See ibid., 307. 

='* Sparre to Stael, October 2, 9 and December 15, 1795; also quoted by 
S. J. Boethius, in Svensk Historisk Tidskrift (1889-90), IX-X, 277. 



PROPOSED ALLIANCE 37 

In the meantime attempts had been made to enlarge the 
confederation of neutrals. On April 28, 1794, the Swedisli 
Minister in London, Lars Engestrom, informed Thomas Pinek- 
ney, the American Minister at that court, that he had received 
instructions to invite the United States to accede to it, and 
communicated a copy of the convention. ^^ Pinckney seemed 
greatly pleased and he communicated the message to his home 
Government. 

Whether the authorities in the United States had received 
any official information about the formation of a league of 
northern powers to enforce the right of neutrals is doubtful. 
The fact is, however, that the question received some attention 
in the instructions for John Jay w4ien he was sent to negotiate 
a treaty with England. Edmund Randolph, who had replaced 
Jefferson as Secretary of State, wrote : ' ' You will have no diffi- 
culty in gaining access to the ministers of Prussia, Denmark, 
and Sweden at the Court of London. The principles of armed 
neutralit}' would abundantly cover our neutral rights. If, there- 
fore, the situation of things with respect to Great Britain should 
dictate the necessity of taking the precaution of foreign co-opera- 
tion upon this head; if no prospect of accomodation should be 
thwarted by the danger of such a measure being known to the 
British Court ; and if an entire view of all our political relations, 
shall, in your judgment, permit the step, you will sound those 
ministers upon the probability of an alliance with their nations 
to support those principles". ^^ 

A few days later Mr. Randolph wrote to John Jay in a 
letter : " If it were not to demonstrate our anxiety for the suc- 
cess of your mission, it would be scarcely worth mentioning a 
circumstance which you will doubtless have ascertained before 

"Engestrom to Sparre, April 29, 1794; Engestrom had formerly been 
Minister to Poland. 

^^Instructions to John Jay, May 6, 1794, Am. State Papers, Foreign 
Affairs, I, 473. 



38 RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH SWEDEN 

that part of j^our instructions relative to Sweden is executed . . 

The President, reviewing the possibilities which are opened 

by the prospect of what you already know, and what will now 
be communicated to you, becomes daily more strenuous that 
Denmark and Sweden shall be well understood, as to the point 
to which they will go with us in case we are driven into a war 
with Great Britain. He would send a minister thither imme- 
diately to explore and negotiate eventually ; but that good faith 
and the state of things in your hands, require the suspension 
of this measure, and he confides that you will, if necessary, 
prepare the minds of those powers, through their representatives 
in London, and give us the earliest notice of the fitness of making 
a more direct and formal application to them". -^ In keeping 
with these instructions Mr. Jay seems to have been intimate with 
the Danish and Swedish ministers at London, ^* but no definite 
results followed. 

In the correspondence of James Monroe who at this time 
was iii France, there is some further information on this sub- 
ject. On October 16, 1794, he wrote: "Denmark and Sweden, 
offended id the unlawful restraint imposed by her [England] 

on their trade in the arbitrary rule of contraband, have 

united their fleet to the amount of about thirty sails, for the 
purpose of vindicating their rights". ^^ But it is evident that 
more direct suggestions had been made earlier for on March 8, 
1795, the Secretary of State wrote to him in the following 
words : ' ' However, your idea as to Denmark and Sweden, though 
it was always attended to, grows of less importance. I shall not 



"Randolph to Jay, May 27, 1794; Am. State Papers, For. Rel., I, 474. 

^^ Mr. S. M. Bemis has written a very interesting article in the Am. 
Historical Review touching upon this phase of the Jay Treaty. " (Am. His- 
torical Revievv', October, 1918). 

''Monroe to Randolph, October 16; December 2, 1794; Am. State Pa- 
pers, For. Rel., I, 92; Monroe, A V^iew of the Conduct of the Executive oC 
the United States, 46. 



PROPOSED ALLIANCE 39 

now answer your proposition, or rather intimation, relative to 
a certain concert, until a future opportunity, and after hearing 
further from you concerning it. You will have concluded from 
my letter, that the step is viewed here as a very strong one". ^^ 
Only a month later the Secretary of State wrote again to Mon- 
roe : "The dispatches which you are understood to have in- 
trusted to Mr. Smith, of this city, not having yet arrived, our 
anxietj^ continues to learn the issue of the concert of which 
you have suggested. You will have been informed by my letter 
of the 8th ultimo that the step is viewed here as a strong one ; 
and, notwithstanding the rapid successes which have attended 
the arms of our ally, we steadily direct our course to the char- 
acter of neutrality which we profess, and, therefore, the more 
it is examined the stronger it appears. You will hear from me 
shortly, in a more particular manner, concerning it, and the 
style in which our negotiation at Paris, ought, in our judgment, 
to be observed. But I must be permitted to remark, that the 
invariable policy of the President is, to be as independent as 
possible, of every nation upon earth; and this policy is not as- 
sumed now for the first time, when, perhaps, it may be insid- 
iously preached by some, who lean to Great Britain, to prevent 
a tendency to France ; but it is wise at all times, and, if steadily 
pursued, will protect our country from the effects of the com- 
motion in Europe".^'' 

In June, Monroe renewed his proposition of alliance with 
the Northern Powers and suggested the addition of Spairi to 
Sweden, Denmark, France, and Holland. If proper arguments, 
based on these facts, would be used on Great Britain, they 
ought to produce an "amicable policy". If the contrary should 

^Randolph to Monroe, March 8, 1795, Am. State Papers, For. Rel., I, 
699; Monroe, A View of the Conduct of the E>eeutive of the United States, 
157. 

"Randolph to Monroe, April 7, 1795, Am. State Papers, For. Rel., T, 
70L 



40 RELATIONE OF x'HE UNITED STATES WlTiI SWEDEN 

happen, however, he would deem it his duty ''immediately to 
advise you of it, by a vessel (in case none other offers) to be 
dispatched for the purpose". ^^ What part it should become the 
United States to assume, if these measures failed, belonged, in 
his opinion, to some one else to determine. 

About a week later Monroe reported a conversation he had 
had with the Swedish Ambassador at Paris in the following 
language : "In conversation a few days past wath Baron Stahl 
[Stael], Ambassador from Sweden, he informed me of a com- 
munication form.erly made by the Court of Sweden to Mr. 
Pinekney at London, for our government, and upon which no 
answer was given, although it was much wished. I desired his 
communication in writing that I might forward it to you, and 
Avhieh was accordingly given, and is herewith transmitted. I 
have no doubt that whatever he says to me is known to the 
committee, as I was informed by some of its members in the 
beginning of the winter, and before the Baron arrived, that such 
an application had been made to us from that quarter. It be- 
longs to me only to forward this paper, and which I do, not 
doubting that I shall be instructed, relative thereto, in the most 
suitable manner". ^^ 

A few years later John Q. Adams wrote about the same 
question while he was minister to Prussia, saying that "the 
present Swedish minister here is the person who in the year 
1793 [1794] delivered to Pinekney certain propositions which 
he then forwarded to our government, the object of which was 
a certain concert for the support of neutral rights. He has 
mentioned this fact to me, and added that no answer had ever 



==' Monroe to the Secretary of State, June 26, 1795, Am. State Papers, 
For. Eel., I, 715; Monroe, A View of the Conduct of the Executive of the 
United States, 178. 

'"Monroe to the Secretary of State, July 6, 1795; Am. State Papers, 
For. Eel., I, 719; Monroe, A View of the Conduct of the Executive of the 
United States, 329. 



PROPOSED ALLIANCE 41 

been received to his proposals. I have heard at various times 
the same observation from other Swedish diplomatic characters, 
and I find the thing noticed in Mr. Monroe's book". 

"The omission of an answer, I am confident, was felt, and 
I fear still is felt by the Swedish government ' '. '° 

Monroe did, however, receive the notice that both his com- 
munication as well as that of Pinckney had been received, but 
he received no instructions to answer Baron Stael in any wa3\ 
Pickering, who succeeded Randolph as Secretary of State, 

August 20, sent the following reply to Monroe : " This 

serves merely to acknowledge the receipt (on the 7 instant) of 
your letter of the 4 (6th) of July with its inclosure. 

"The President is at Mount Vernon. This forbids me say- 
ing anything on the subject of Baron Stahl's [Stael] applica- 
tion. Besides, I do not conceive that the Executive could even 
attempt to negotiate about it until Congress should provide the 
means of rendering an agreement efficient. The proposition 
with a copy of the convention between Sweden and Denmark 
I find were transmitted from London by Mr. Pinckney in his 
letter of the 8 of last May ; it does not appear when they were 
received at this office". ^^ In regard to the joining of the con- 
vention between Denmark and Sweden of March 27, 1794, "for 
the maintenance of the rights of neutral navigation", President 
Washington submitted the question to his cabinet in July 1794. 
Randolph was in favor of it, Hamilton, Knox, and Bradford 
against it. Knox in his answer said in part : ' ' There may be a 
state of things operating upon Denmark and Sweden, essentially 
different from that operating in America. States as well as 
individuals often have secret motives for their conduct. I dread 
being linked in with the follies or vices of European Powers. . 



'Writings of John Q. Adams, (Ford, ed.), II, 303. 
Writings of James Monroe, (S. M. Hamilton, ed.) II, 329. 
' Quoted in Writings of James Monroe, II, 329. 



42 EELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH SWEDEN 

In the main the armed neutrality of 1794 was a failure 
principally on account of the diplomacy of Great Britain which 
resulted in the agreement with Russia for the division of 
Poland, and on account of the Jay Treaty. This left the north- 
ern combination too feeble to enforce tlieir rights and effectively 
protect their commerce. 

The treaty between the United States and Sweden as well 
as that with Prussia, was about to expire. In order to under- 
take the work of renewing these treaties John Quincy Adams 
was transferred to Berlin. ^^ There he met the Swedish minister 
and began the work. The instructions which Adams received 
from home requested him to abandon the principle "that free 
ships make free goods". ^* In regard to this omission Mr. Pick- 
ering, the Secretary of State, made the following explanation: 
' ' The principle is peculiarly interesting to us, because our naval 
concerns are mercantile and not war-like; and you will readily 
perceive that the abandonment of that principle was suggested 
by the measures of the belligerent powers, during the present 
war, in which we have found that neither its obligations by the 
pretended law of nations, nor the solemn stipulations of treaties, 
secured its observation ; on the contrary, it has been made the 
sport of events". ^^ The following March the Secretary of State 
again had occasion to revert to this subject in a letter to Mr. 
Adams. He said: "As the war continues and it now seems 
scarcely possible for the United States not to become a party 
in it, you will doubtless be determined by your instructions of 
the 15th and 17th of July last, in renewing our treaties with 
Prussia and Sweden, and reject the article in each which stipu- 
lates that free ships shall make free goods The Swedish 

and Prussian commerce will then be only on the footing of the 

^Memoirs of John Q. Adams (C. F. Adams, ed.), I, 199. 
" Am. State Papers, For. Eel., II, 250. 

^ Pickering to Adams, July 17, 1797 ; Am. State Papers, For Eel., II. 
250. 



PROPOSl-:!) ALLIANCE 43 

commerce of Denmark, with whom we have no treaty ; " 

But Adams answered that although he would be guided by the 
instructions, he had recently written that in his opinion the 
alteration would be inexpedient. The reason he gave for this 
opinion v\^as that "Sweden and Prussia are both strongly attached 
to the principle of making the ships protect the cargo. They 
have more than once contended that such is the rule even by 
the ordinary laws of nations". "^ But in November of the same 
year the Prussian Minister wrote to Mr. Adams that the prin- 
ciple of free ships makes the merchandise free had "not been 
sufficiently respected during the tw^o last wars, and especially in 
that which is now carried on; and that contradictory dispositions 
of the principal belligerent Powers not permitting, at present 
time, a satisfactory adjustment of the litigated question " ^* 

The Swedish minister at Berlin with whom John Q. Adams 
started negotiations for the renewal of the treaty soon after- 
wards took ill with a disease that caused his death, and some 
time elapsed before his successor was appointed wherefore "the 
treaty was suffered to expire". ^^ 

United States had also agreed to the Jay treaty ^vithout any 
provision as to the freedom of cargo on free ships, wherefore the 
British interests triumphed over the principles of international 
law advocated by the neutral nations. 

After the close of the war. Congress, by an act of March 3, 
1815, made a proposal to all maritime nations to lay aside "the 
system of retaliatory restrictions and exclusions", and to place 
the shipping of both parties to the common trade, "on a footing 
of equality, in respect to the duties of tonnage and imports". 
This offer was accepted only by Great Britain and Sweden. " 

™ Am. Stale Papers, For. Eel.. II, 251. 
"Am. State Papers, For. Rcl., II, 252. 
^ Aimals of Congress, 6 session, p. 1235. 
=" Memoirs of John Q. Adams (C. P. Adams, ed.), I, 199. 
■"J. Q. Adams, Message to Congress, December 6, 1825; 19 Congress, 
1 sess., Senate Doc, 2, p. 4. 



44 RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH SWEDEN 

Not until 1856, at a meeting of plenipotentiaries in Paris, 
was the principle free ships, free goods, renewed, together with 
three additional principles : 

1. Privateering is, and remains abolished ; 

2. Neutral flag covers enemy 's goods with exception of con- 

traband of war; 

3. Neutral goods with the exception of contraband of war, 

are not liable to capture under enemy's flag; 

4. "Blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective; 

that is to say, maintained by a force sufficient really 

to prevent access to the coast of the enemy ' '. *^ 

This proposal failed to be adopted by the nations and although 

the conference of London in 1909 renewed the recommendation, 

the world war came on without these principles having been 

recognized as a part of the law of nations, 

" Senate Doc, 104 ; 34 Congress, 1 sess., XVI. 



CHAPTER III 

The Stralsund Claims 

At the treaty of Tilsit in 1807, Napoleon and Alexander I 
of Russia decided between themselves what to do with the rest 
of the world, and especially with Sweden. Alexander took this 
step without consulting Sweden regardless of the fact that he 
had entered into a military convention with Prussia that "they 
should agree between themselves and with the King of Sweden 
regarding the steps ... to be taken to obtain safety". In direct 
disregard of these stipulations Russia and Prussia entered into 
an agreement with Napoleon regarding both armistice and peace 
without consulting Sweden. ^ From a study of the correspond- 
ence of the leading characters it seems fairly certain that Prussia 
wished to keep the King of Sweden uninformed about the agree- 
ment in order to assert her ambition of leadership in northern 
Germany, "which aroused the liveliest uneasiness both in Lon- 
don and Vienna". ^ The plan of Alexander seems to have been 
to advance the interest of Russia by offering Napoleon an alliance 
against England. To be sure Russia promised to become the 
mediator between England and France, but the lines along which 
this was to be done were clearly drawn and contained two mail, 
principles : 

1. The flags of all states were to have similar and complete 
freedom of the seas; 



* Grade, Sverige och Tilsit Alliansen, 12. 
^ Grade, Op. Cit., 14. 



46 RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH SWEDEN 

2. The French territory and colonies conquered since 1805 
should be restored. If England should refuse to accept 
this offer, all harbors in Germany were to be closed 
to the commerce of England. ^ 
In regard to Sweden it was stated that Russia ought to con- 
quer Finland in order to relieve the "beautiful ladies of Peters- 
burg" from "hearing the Swedish cannons". Nothing specific 
seems to have been said regarding Finland in the negotiations at 
Tilsit ; only the traite d 'alliance has a direct reference to Sweden, 
and it specifies that the contracting parties should together and 
simultaneously request the three courts at ' ' Copenhagen, Stock- 
holm, and Lisbon to close their ports to English commerce, recall 
their envoys from London, and declare war on England". If any 
of the three courts should refuse, that one should be treated as 
an enemy by the contracting parties; and if Sweden should re- 
fuse, Denmark should be forced to declare war on it. * After 
Tilsit, therefore, it became impossible for Sweden to remain 
neutral; war was imperative, and the remaining question was, 
should the war be waged against England or against France. 
Since Sweden refused to negotiate for peace with Napoleon, 
Russia was bound by treaty to declare war against Sweden on 
land and sea. 

It appears that Alexander, brother-in-law of the King of 
Sweden, had promised Napoleon that he would inform Gustavus 
IV regarding the condition of this relation, ^ but, although Alex- 
ander met the Swedish envoy in Prussia at least four times after 
the arrangement had been made, there seems to have been no 
attempt on his part to inform his former ally of the change. 
Russia had even promised to force the King of Sweden to nego- 
tiate for peace with Napoleon, ° which Sweden least of all desired. 

^ Grade, Sverige oeh Tilsit Alliansen, 29 ; and sources there cited. 

■' Traite de paix, Art. 5. 

" Brinchman, dispatch to Memel, July 15, 1807. 

° Grade, Op. Git., 66 and sources cited there. 



T?TR RTRALSUND CLAIMS 47 

But Napoleon wished it clearly understood that he liad no plans 
against Swedish Pomerania, nor did he require that the Swedish 
monarch should recognize him as Emperor of France. ^ 

When Alexander notified Gustavus IV about the peace, he 
failed to express the interest of Sweden in regard to the peace, 
nor did he make any attempt to explain to the King of Sweden 
whether he made the views of Sweden known to Napoleon or 
not, nor did he notify his relative about the attempt to offer 
England peace. These facts make it appear as if Russia had no 
objections to the continuance of the struggle between Napoleon 
and Sweden. ® 

On September 14, 1807, Napoleon dictated instrmctions to 
his minister of foreign affairs for Savary, his minister in Russia, 
in which he stated that Sweden ought to unite with France and 
Russia to defend the "freedom of the Baltic." Already on Au- 
gust 26 Napoleon had mentioned this fact to Alexander, asking 
what he intended to do in order to aid Denm^ark against an Eng- 
lish attack and to force the King of SM'^eden to join with them 
in "his truest interest, the freedom of the Baltic". ° He added: 
"At any rate your Majesty may count on m.e. T have an army 
in Hamburg. With interest I await information from your ]\Ia- 
jest.y regarding these events". Napoleon expressed his thought 
even more clearly to his representative in Petrograd, General 
Savary: "I think that Russia ought to send an army against 
Sweden to force her to unite with Denmark. The Emperor need 
only tell nie V\4iat is necessary; I have a considerable army at 
Hamburg". ^"^ 

The instructions on September 14, 1807, seem to have been 
designed to explain the secret Tilsit alliance. According to this, 
the action against Sweden should have three parts : Alexander I 

' Ohampagny to Savary, Rambouillet, September 14, 1807. 

« Grade, Op. Cit., 68. 

'Saint Cloud, August 26, Corresp., XV, 13078. 

" Saint Cloud, August 26, Ccrresp., XV, 13079. 



48 EELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH SWEDEN 

ought to try b^^ persuasion to make his brother-in-law change 
his policy ; if this failed, Russia should occupy Finland, and 
France together with Denmark should threaten Sweden from the 
west; should this plan also fail, Sweden must be "forced to do 
its duty ' ', and that work would devolve on Russia. ^^ The whole 
plan of Napoleon is permeated with a desire to reach an under- 
standing with Sweden without dismembering the country, for, 
although Russia was authorized to occupy Finland, there was no 
permission to conquer it. The threat to occupy Finland was only 
a means to force Sweden to accept the continental system. Na 
poleon wrote with that idea in view November 1, in the following 
words: "If Russia declares war on Sweden, Denmark will do 
the same, and a Danish army will attack her at the same time ' '. ^^ 

On November 16, Napoleon set out on a trip to Italy and 
while on this trip he received the information that Alexander 
had declared war against England. This was but a step to a 
war with Sweden. Napoleon wrote to the Tsar : " I am very much 
pleased to see the work of Tilsit develop. Of all the countries on 
the continent Sweden alone lives in peace with England; Your 
Majestj- will presumably adjust the matter". ^^ 

Alexander adjusted his relation to Sweden in his own Avay. 
On October 7, the envoj^s of Sweden and Denmark received iden- 
tical notes in which the Tsar alluded to the conventions of 1780 
and 1800 between the northern powers to close the Baltic, and 
expressed a desire to hear what attitude the courts of Sweden 
and Denmark had decided to assume regarding the action of 
Great Britain in bombarding Copenhagen. The Tsar sympa- 
thized with Denmark, but he had seemingly no enmity to Eng- 
land. As a proof of the friendly attitude toward England it was 



" Grade, Sverige oeh Tilsit AUiansen, 84, where a full discussion of 
these problems is given. 

"Napoleon to Champagny, Fontainbleau, November 1, 1807. 
"Napoleon to Alexander, Venice, December 7, 1807, Corresp., XVI, 

i.-isss. 



THE STRALSUND CLAIMS 49 

mentioned that no Russian port had been closed against English 
commerce while those of Prussia had. 

Gustavus IV sought in vain for a reasonable ground of ex- 
planation of the action of the Russian Government, and he found 
no other than to place it in connection with the secret agreement 
which he had every reason to suppose had been adopted at Tilsit. 
Gustavus IV then adopted the explanation that the Tsar had 
promised Napoleon that he would try to force all the powers of 
the Baltic to close their ports against England. Dr. Grade asks : 
"could the proposal to renew the conventions of 1780 and 1800 
very well have been a veiled scheme of which use was made in 
order to have a pretext for war". " He answers the question in 
the negative. But Russia broke with England and besides pro- 
claimed the principles of the armed neutrality. ^^ 

November 13, the Swedish minister in Petrograd had an in- 
terview with Alexander I and delivered a letter from his King. 
At that interview the ambassador expressed a fear in regard to 
the movement of troops toward Finland and asked for some posi- 
tive statement in regard to the aims of the Emperor. Alexander 
assured him that it was nothing but a safety measure, and that 
he wished his troops at hand in case of need; that he had no 
tastes for territorial expansion; and that the rocks of Finland 
were not in the least tempting to him. ^*^ 

The following day, November 14, the Emperor had a meeting 
with the French Ambassador and at this meeting it is reported 
that Alexander said: "I had a long conversation with him [Swe- 
dish minister], and I demanded of him emphatically that he 
should give his court the advice to approach France quickly, 
while I showed the danger in which a small country like Sweden 



" Grade, Sverige och Tilsit Alliansen, 109. 

» Grade, Op. Cit., 123. 

"Quoted in Grade, Sverige och Tilsit Alliansen, 132, 



50 RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH SWEDEN 

was placed by not accepting the common cause". ^'^ But this 
reference to the conference with the Swedish minister was decid- 
edly erroneous for it gave the opposite point of view from be- 
ginning to end. The reasons for this duplicity on the part of 
Russia are stated by Dr. Grade as a desire not to impart any fear 
into the Court of Sweden, and to relieve himself from any fur- 
ther pressure from the French ambassador. ^^ 

The Danish minister soon afterward reported a conference 
he had had with the Russian minister of foreign affairs at which 
the whole line of procedure was outlined. If the answer from 
the Swedish monarch was unsatisfactory, Denmark should attack 
Skane and Russia should simultaneously attack Finland. But 
when the Swedish minister had a meeting with the minister of 
foreign affairs, he was assured most emphatically that the Em- 
peror had no hostile plans against Sweden, but, on the contrarj^ 
that he wished that he could prove his high regard and friend- 
ship. ^° At this meeting the Swedish minister suggested the neu- 
trality of Sweden in view of eventual conflicts on the continent, 
if England refrained from entering the Baltic. 

The above analysis has been considered necessary in order 
to show that all of northern Europe with the exception of Sweden 
was included in the continental system. The ports that were not 
closed by the continental system were closed by the English block- 
ade. Some of the American merchants were also very much in- 
terested in the commerce with Sv.^eden. Stephen Girard was one 
of them and he had his agents everywhere and his vessels were 
exposed to violent treatment. His agents wrote that there were 
about one hundred American vessels at Gothenburg. The super- 
cargoes of some of these vessels seeing the complication in the 



"Sboniik, Imperatorskago Russkago Istcritcheskago Obstchestva, vol. 
83, p. 227 f. 

"Grade, Sverige och Tilsit Alliansen, 135. 
'* Stedingk, Posthumug. Memoirs, II, 392. 



THE STRALSUND CLAIMS 51 

politics of Europe, and not knowinj^ what to do, hastened to Ham- 
burg to investigate what could be done there. ^° 

About this time the Rosseau, a vessel belonging to Stephen 
Girard, was sent to Stralsund in Swedish Pomerania, and then 
ordered in ballast to Russia. One of Girard 's agents, Mr. Hutch- 
inson, wrote that he was undecided as to what to do when on 
May 25 he heard of the decree of Rambouillet and hurried to 
Stralsund "to accelerate if possible the sale" of the property 
and the departure of the ships before "the French consul" 
should be sent to that place to enforce the decree against the com- 
merce of the United States. ^^ Mr. Hutchinson, however, arrived 
too late, and about 530 bales of cotton on the ship were seques- 
tered "together with all other American property at Stral- 
sund ' '. ^^ 

Although the American Government could not offer effective 
relief to its merchants, Congress adopted a resolution on January 
3, 1810, requesting the President to lay before the "House any 
information he may possess relative to the blockade of the ports 
of the Baltic by France, and the exclusion of neutral vessels by 
Russia, Sweden and Denmark". ^^ On January 12 the answer 
was reported "that no information" had been received at the 
Department of State relative to the blockade of the ports of the 
Baltic. But this answer was accompanied by the translation of 
an "Ukase" of the Russian Government, dated May 14, 1809, and 
a translation of instruction given to the privateers of Denmark 
on September 14, 1807, but no documentary charge was made 
against Sweden. ^^ In view of the fact that so little information 
was available on the Baltic situation the House adopted a resolu- 

==» McMaster, Life and Times of Stephen Girard. IT. 125. 

^* McMaster, Life and Times of Stephen Girard, II, 124. 

^^ McMaster, Op. Git., II, 125. 

^' House Journal, 11 Cong. 1 sess., 155 ; State Papers and Public Docu- 
ments, VII, 342. 

^* Am. State Papers, For. Rel., Ill, 327 ; State Papers and Public Doc- 
uments, VII, 342. 



52 EELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH SWEDEN 

tion on April 9, 1810, "That the Committee on Foreign Relations 
be discharged from the consideration of the message from the 
President of the United States of the twelfth of January last, 
communicating information relative to the blockade of the Baltic 
by France, and the exclusion of neutral vessels by Russia, Swe- 
den, and Denmark". ^^ 

The facts were that the British had blockaded the Sound, so 
that all vessels must pass through the Belt in order to enter th:^ 
Baltic; ^^ and a French privateer, "La Minute No. 2", was cruis- 
ing off Helsingor just outside the Danish jurisdiction. This 
privateer did a great deal of injury to the Swedish commerce and 
therefore the Swedish Government captured it and held the 
sailors as captives. ^^ At first Napoleon paid no attention to this 
act, but later he sent his army into Swedish Pomerania to cap- 
ture that Province and gave as his excuse the fact that Sweden 
had captured his privateer. 

So far the United States had no diplomatic representative 
but only consular representation in Sweden. The Swedish Gov- 
ernment was, however, much interested in having a minister or 
charge d 'affairs from the United States to "maintain and extend 
friendlj^ relations and commercial intercourse". The Swedish 
Government was prepared to receive such a representative and 
had already designated a person for that mission. ^^ The man 
who was ' ' designated ' ' for the mission to the United States was 
Mr. Kantzow, who had returned from Brazil a short time before, 
v/here he had resided as charge d 'affairs for several years. Before 
Mr. Kantzow was sent to Brazil he had served as consul general 
of Sweden in Portugal. Mr. Kantzow refused to go as charge 
d 'affairs, but he consented to go as minister. The United States 
consul in Sweden, John Speyer, wrote about him in the following 

'» House Journal, 11 Cong. 1 sess., (1809-1810), 353. 
=« McMaster. Life an.l Times of Stephen Girard, II, 125. 
"Am. State Papers, For. Eel., Ill, 559. 
=* Am. State Papers, For, Eel.; Ill, 619. 



THE STRALSUND CLAIMS 53 

words: "From the personal knowledge 1 have of Mr. Kantzow, 
I think him well calculated to contribute to the good under- 
standing of our respective Governments. ' ' ^'■^ On the 24 of March 
following, the Minister of Foreign Affairs notified Mr. Speyer 
that Mr. Kantzow had been appointed, and he, accompanied by 
his family, would leave for England on his way to the United 
States early in May. But for some reason Mr. Kantzow did not 
start on his mission until August 15, 1812. When he left Sweden, 
the Prince Regent directed him to represent to the English Gov- 
ernment the desire of Sweden "to see a good understanding 
restored with the United States", In reporting the above fact 
the consul said: "as this Government expects the appointment 
of a minister or a charge de 'affairs, in return for Mr. Kantzow 's 
mission, I have not presented the commission as consul for this 
place. I am apprehensive it might be ungraciously received here 
after their notification of the appointment of a minister ' '. ■"' 
When President Madison, therefore, referred to foreign relation 
in his message of November 4, 1812, he could truthfully say: 
"Sweden also professes sentiments favorable to the subsisting 
harmony ' '. ^^ 

During those war-torn times it was important for any nation 
to treat its friends with consideration. The Commissioner of 
prisoners in London, Mr. Beasley, reported to the Secretary of 
State: "Notwithstanding the present apparent irrelation of the 
Swedish Government, I have been assured by Mr. de Kantzow, 
and I learn from other sources that it has invariably manifested 
the most friendly disposition towards the United States. Those 
American vessels which have sought shelter in its ports have ex- 
perienced perfect protection. British cruisers are not allowed. 



^' Jobn Speyer to Secretary of State, January 21, 1812, Am. State Pa 
pers. For. Eel., Ill, 619; Annals of Congress, 13 Cong., 1 sess., I, 94. 

°*Am. State Papers, For. Rel., Ill, 619; Annals of Congress, 13 Cong.. 
1 sess., I, 94. 

" House Journal, 12 Congress, 2 sess., 541. 



54 RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH SWEDEN 

within its territories, to dispose of the prizes they take from the 
United States ; and, in some instances, the protection of Swedish 
convoy has been afforded to American vessels passing through the 
Sound ' '. ^^ This circumstance was mentioned to Mr. Kantzow 
by Lord Castlereagh "with no satisfaction". Mr. Beasley added 
three reasons why a minister ought to be appointed to Sweden. 
In the first place, he feared that the "intrigue of our enemy" 
would, if not speedily counteracted, produce a state of things 
decidedly unfriendly. Secondly, the jealousy between Sweden 
and Denmark, long existing, had, it was stated, contributed 
greatly to the feeling which had given rise to this mission. Third- 
ly, ' ' the result of all the American property now in the dominions 
of Sweden will depend on the course which the Government of 
the United States may pursue on this critical and delicate emer- 
gency". ^^ 

It was, however, not before May 31, 1813, that President 
Madison nominated a minister to Sweden. His choice fell upon 
Jonathan Russell, who was charge d 'affairs at London when he 
was nominated. ^^ Now followed an investigation of the official 
conduct of the minister nominated and the following resolution 
was adopted: "That the President of the United States be re- 
quested to inform the Senate whether any communication has 
been received from Jonathan Russell admitting or denjnng the 
declaration of the Duke of Bassano to Mr. Barlow, that he in- 
formed his predecessor of the repeal of the Berlin and Milan 
decrees at the date of that decree ' '. In addition the Senate called 
upon the President for any "correspondence which may have 
passed between the United States and the King of Sweden, re 
specting the interchange of public ministers between the two Gov- 

"'Ani. State Papers, Tor. Eel., Ill, 618; Annals of Congress, 13 Couk-. 
1 sess., 93. 

=■' Annals of Congress, 13 Cong., 1 sess., 93; Am. State Papers, For. 
Eel., Ill, 618. 

"^Ani. State Papers, For. Eel., Ill, 618. 



THE STRALSUND CLAIMS 55 

ernments". ^^ Five days later, June 7, 1813, the President sub- 
mitted the answer which was that ' ' no direct correspondence has 
taken place on the subject." But several extracts of letters from 
Mr. Speyer together with a letter from Mr. Beasley regarding 
the wishes of the Swedish Government in that regard were sub 
mitted. ^^ 

On the same day Mr. Goldsborough of the committee to whom 
the nomination of Jonathan Russell was referred, reported "That, 
in pursuance of the orders of the Senate, the committee met the 
Secretary of State by appointment at the office of the Depart- 
ment of State, when they were informed by the Secretary that 
there was no official denial or admission of Mr. Jonathan Rus- 
sell, that the allegation of the Duke of Bassano to Mr. Barlow, 
referred to, was true; but that he [the Secretary] had a private 
letter from Mr. Russell subsequent to the allegation of the Duke 
of Bassano, in which he understood the allegation to be unequivo- 
cally denied". ^^ On motion it was decided that further consid- 
eration of the nomination should be postponed. Then Mr. Golds- 
borough submitted the following resolution : ' ' That it is inex- 
pedient at this time to send a Minister Plenipoteniary to Swe- 
den". 

Four days later, however, the Senate "resumed the consid- 
eration of the nomination of Jonathan Russell together with the 
motion of Mr. Goldsborough thereon of the 7 instant". ^^ The 
whole question was again referred to a committee "to enquire 
and report thereon". After some debate it was agreed that the 
"subject be postponed". On June 14, when the subject was 
again discussed, it was "referred to a committee, with the com- 
munications therein mentioned", with instruction "respectfully 

^ Annals of Congress, 13 Cong., 1 sess., 92 

="'Am. Slate Papers, For. Rel., Ill, 618; Annals of Congress, 13 Cong., 
1 sess., 92. 

" Annals of Congress, 13 Congress, 1 sess., T, 04. 
^ Annals of Congress, 13 Congress, 1 sess., I, 94 ff. 



56 RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH SWEDEN 

to confer with the President of the United States upon the sub- 
ject of said nomination, and report thereon". The committee 
consisted of Messrs. Wells, Giles, and King. ^'•' After the ex- 
change of notes between the President and the committee in 
which the President complained of "a continuance of his indis- 
position ' ', the Secretary of State notified the committee on June 
23, that, in order to obviate any further delay in the proceedings 
of the Senate on the nomination of the Minister Plenipotentiary 
from the United States to Sweden, he had been authorized to con - 
fer with them on that subject and to communicate any informa- 
tion which they might desire from the Executive in relation to 
it. *° On the following day the Senate agreed to the motion by 
Mr. Goldsborough that it was "inexpedient at this time to send 
a Minister Plenipotentiary to Sweden". The vote recorded was 
22 yeas and 14 nays. ^^ This refusal of the Senate to ratify the 
appointment of a Minister Plenipotentiary to Sweden was made 
in full view of the fact that Sweden was virtually the only coun- 
try in Europe that admitted American merchant vessels without 
restrictions. 

In a communication to the Senate on July 6, the President 
further explained his failure to meet the Senate committee in a 
conference. The principal objection was that the President and 
Senate were co-ordinate departments in regard to appointments 
and treaties. If the Senate wished information before their final 
decision the practice was to request the Executive to furnish it. 
' ' The appointment of a committee of the Senate to confer imme- 
diately with the Executive himself, appears to lose sight of the 
co-ordinate relation between the Executive and the Senate, which 
the Constitution has established, and which ought therefore to be 
maintained". *^ 

^"Annals of Congress, 13 Congress, 1 sess., I, 95. 
*" Annals of Congress, 13 Congress, 1 sess., I, 97. 
" Annals of Congress, 13 Congress, 1 sess., I, 97-8, 
" Annals of Congress, 13 Congress, 1 sess., I, 95. 



THE STliALSUND CLAIMS 57 

The principal reason for withJiolding the ratification of the 
appointment of Mr. Russell as Minister to Sweden seems to have 
been connected with his conduct while charge d 'affairs to Paris. 
In order to trace the problem to its source it is necessary to know 
that the House of Representatives called upon the President on 
June 21, to furnish information regarding this matter. On July 
12, 1813, the answer came in the form of a long and able survey 
of the whole relation with Prance and Great Britain. The French 
Glovernment had evidently failed to make known to Mr. Russell 
the supposed repeal of the Berlin and Milan decrees by a decree 
dated April 28, 1811. The first knowledge of that decree which 
the Government of the United States had was gained through 
Mr. Barlow in a communication dated May 12, 1812. The decree 
was entirely unknown to Mr. Russell, which fact he communi- 
cated to Mr. Barlow in a letter of May 11, 1812. " 

The advisability of appointing a Minister to Sweden at this 
time has been stated by a well known historian who said : "When 
22 senators including Jeremiah Mason, Christopher Gore, Samuel 
Dana, Rufus King, and William B. Giles, declared that a min- 
ister resident in Sweden was inexpedient in the summer of 1813, 
they declared what every other well informed man knew to be an 
error. If any American envoy was ever expedient, it was an 
envoy to Sweden in 1813 ; for in Sweden at that moment all that 
was left of American commerce centered after being driven from 
England, and the political interests of Sweden were greatly in- 
volved with those of the United States. The error was less to 
be denied, because, only six months afterwards, the Senate ad- 
mitted itself in the wrong, and approved the appointment of Mr. 
Russell. ** 

On January 14, 1814, the President nominated John Q. 
Adams, J. A. Bayard, Henry Clay, and Jonathan Russell as 



"Annals of Congress, 13 Congress, 1 sess., II, 2074. 
"Adams, Henry, History of the United States, VII, 64. 



58 EELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH SWEDEN 

commissioners to negotiate directly with Great Britain regarding 
peace, and the Senate confirmed the nomination, January 18, 
without opposition except the further nomination of Jonathan 
Russell as Minister to Sweden, which was "confirmed by the 
narrow vote of sixteen to fourteen ' '. *^ 

The first duty that Mr. Russell was to perform in Sweden 
was to make known to the Swedish Government the arrangement 
which had been made with Great Britain "to treat at Gothen- 
burg for peace with that power".*® But soon Messrs. Bayard 
and Gallatin agreed with the representatives of the British Gov- 
ernment to transfer the negotiations to Ghent. *^ 

The second duty that Mr. Russell was called upon to per- 
form was of an entirely different nature. Reference has already 
been made to the fact that Sweden was forced to adopt the Con- 
tinental System. This system required the capture of all neutral 
vessels that entered Swedish waters, and in certain cases Napo- 
leon's own agents sequestered them. Sweden tried in every pos- 
sibly way to keep on good terms with England and still be neu- 
tral. Since all the harbors on the continent and practically the 
harbors of Great Britain were closed to neutral countries, Swe- 
dish ports were swarming with vessels which tried to trade with 
the belligerents through Sweden. This brought a considerable 
number of American vessels into Sweden and the Swedish Prov- 
ince of Pomerania in Northern Germany. The sequestration of 
cotton at Stralsund in 1810 has already been described. In 
1814, an agent, Mr. Curwen, was sent to Sweden to investigate 
some other questions and also to seek "payment for the cotton 
sequestered at Stralsund". Mr. Curwen was presented to Count 
Engestrom, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, by Mr. Speyer, the 
American consul. After a long conversation, the Minister con- 



« Adams, Henry, Op. Git., VII, 371. 
*"Rnssoll to Count Engestrom, April 30, 1814. 
''Russell to Monroe, June 6, 1814. 



THE STRALSUND CLAIMS 59 

eluded by sayings that if Mr. Curwen would make a communica- 
tion to Mr. Speyer to be sent to the foreign office, Count Enge- 
strom would give him a letter to Baron Wetterstedt, the chan- 
cellor, who was on the continent with the Crown Prince. The 
final settlement, said the Minister of Foreign Affairs, rested with 
the Crown Prince. Mr. Curwen went to Karlskrona from Stock- 
holm, and when he reached that place he decided to continue to 
Gothenburg rather than to go to Stralsund because the Crown 
Prince, who was one of the leaders in the war against Napoleon, 
would be too much taken up with battles to pay any attention 
to claims against his Government. *^ 

Such was the condition of affairs when Mr. Russell was 
called upon to leave Sweden on the joint mission at Ghent. John 
L. Lawrence was appointed charge d 'affairs during his absence, 
which was from June 7, 1814, to May 19, 1815. *^ The service 
of Mr. Lawrence in Sweden was of no great importance, but it 
was during his stay at Stockholm that the American Government 
requested the removal of the Swedish consul at Baltimore, Mr. 
Aquitow, who had been found to be communicating information 
to the enemy of the United States. In his reply Count Enge- 
strom stated that "his Majesty recognized the principle that a 
public functionary accredited near a foreign Government, oughi 
to pay due respect to its laws; and should hold no communica- 
tion, however innocent, with its foes, without its previous knowl- 
edge and consent ' '. Therefore, if the Government of the United 
States wished the man removed, it should be done. ^^ 

The real work for the American Minister came when he was 
authorized to take up the work left unfinished by Mr. Curwen, 
namely to obtain indemnity for American property sequestered 
at Stralsund. In keeping with his instruction Mr. Russell pre- 



McMastcr, Life and Times of Stephen Girard, IT, 270 ff. 
House Documents, 19 Congress, 2 sess., No. 73. 
Tjawrence to Monroe, February 24, 1815. 



60 RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH SWEDEN 

sented the whole question to Count Engestrom, Minister of State 
for Foreign Affairs. 

The facts in the case, briefly stated, were : 

1. The sequestration was made at the instance of the French 

authorities present in Stralsund in June, 1810; 

2. In the beginning of August, 1811, the sequestration was 

raised by the permission of the French authorities, 
but those authorities still insisted that the money ob- 
tained from the sale of the property should be applied 
to the fortification of Pomerania against the English 
naval forces ; 

3. The property was sold by the Swedish authorities ; 

4. Frequent promises of an indemnity had "ever been 

made by the Swedish Government to the injured citi- 
zens of the United States"; " 

5. The cost of American property in the United States was 

given as 110,000 Spanish dollars, and the value was 
estimated by Sweden at 193,000 "rix dollar Pomera- 
nian currency", and sold at 151,000 rix dollar of the 
same currency. 
During the original sequestration the Swedish Government 
sent more than thirty despatches to France "in order to obtain 
a release of the sequestered property" or a permission to sell it 
either on Swedish account or on the joint account of Sweden 
and France, according to a note sent by Baron Wetterstedt to 
Mr. Speyer. The Swedish Government never urged any right 
or justification for the sequestration except the pressure from 
France, and Sweden always expressed the desire to return the 
property to the American owners. The American Minister fur- 
ther supported his very able note hy a reference to the advantages 
Sweden had had from Pomerania after the Napoleonic wars ; it 



"Annals of Congress, 16 Congress, 1 sess., II, 2264 f. Am. State Pa- 
pers, For. Rel., IV, 636. 



THE STRALSUND CLAIMS 61 

had, he said, "furnished an equivalent at the treaty of Kiel for 
the acquisition of Norway, but subsequently a sufficient con- 
sideration for three million and a half of dollars received from 
Prussia". 

In regard to the equivalent for Norway, the fact was that 
at the treaty of Kiel Denmark ceded Norway to Sweden for 
Swedish Pomerania. Sweden asserted, however, that since Nor- 
way was not turned over to Sweden without further fighting, 
Denmark had violated its claim to the Swedish province. Pom- 
erania was therefore sold to Prussia in connection with the 
Congress of Vienna. ^^ According to a report from Mr. Russell, 
the proceeds of the sale of the sequestered property in Pomer- 
ania were appropriated: 1) "to pay the inheritance which has 
fallen due to the former Royal Family about 300,000 Riks-dol- 
lar"; 2) "for the property in Sweden belonging to the said 
family 681,419 Riksdollar 18 shillings and 3 rundstycks"; 3) 
"the residue to discharge the debts contracted by the last 
war"." 

Practically nothing was heard from these claims for a long 
time mainly for two reasons : 1 ) Mr. Russell left Sweden tempo- 
rarily November 1, 1816, and did not return until December 
14 of the following year leaving Mr. Christopher Hughes as 
charge d ' affairs in Sweden during his absence. ^* Mr. Hughes 
did not feel inclined to take up the matter since he was filling 
the position only temporarily; and 2) the parties in the United 
States sent John Ecky of Philadelphia to represent them. •" 

The Swedish Government admitted to Mr. Ecky, as had 
been done to all other representatives, the justice of the claims, 
and the Crown Prince offered him "a quantity of cannon and 



"Russell to Monroe, November 15, 1815. 

•* Ibid. 

" House Documents, 19 Congress, 2 scss.. No. 73. 

" Hughes to Secretary of State, May 6, 1S17. 



62 EELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH SWEDEN 

of gun powder, as a part payment in a reduction of the debt". ^^ 
This proposition had evidently been made to Mr. Speyer before, 
for it is spoken of as an old one. But Mr, Eeky received ''in- 
structions from his principals not to receive the objects which 
were offered", ^^ and he left Sweden and went to Hamburg on 
January 23, 1818. ^« On his return to United States Mr. Ecky 
reported the matter to the Secretary of State. °^ 

Because Mr. Hughes did not enter into the sequestration 
claims as vigorously as Jonathan Russell, it must not be as 
sumed that he let the whole matter drop. He had frequent 
conferences with Count Engestrom, and was referred by him 
to Baron Wetterstedt who was more intimately familiar with 
the business being in charge of provincial affairs at the time 
the sequestration occurred. Baron Wetterstedt acknowledged 
that the United States citizens had been wronged and declared 
"the disposition of this Government, and especially of the Prince 
Royal, to indemnify us for it". *"' As proof of this disposition 
the Baron cited the fact that the Prince Royal had offered "a 
parcel of cannon, powder, and balls which was his own private 
property to the agent of the claiments, as a part payment, and 
as a commencement of restitution". The only reasons this offer 
was not accepted were that the objects "would not pay the ex- 
penses of carrying them to America, and the amount of which 

would not equal one tenth part of the amount of the 

claims ". ^^ 

Mr. Hughes, nevertheless, almost gave up all hopes of ob- 
taining anything from the sequestration claims. At one time 
he said : " If it could be once brought to the sense of this Govern- 



••" Hughes to Secretary of State, May 6, 1S17. 

" Hughes to Secretary of State, June 4, 1817. 

■'"Eussell to J. Q. Adams, January 22, 1818. 

™ Memoirs of John Q. Adams, IV, 424. 

""Hughes to Secretary of State, June 4, and July 10, 1817, 

'"Hughes to Secretary of State, June 4, 1817. 



Til 10 STRALSUND CLAIMS 63 

ment, that it would be for their interest to pay our citizens, they 
would settle the claims immediately". But a month later he 
wrote : ' ' There is an undisguised disposition here to do some- 
thing for the claiments ; but so long as it is believed that our 
government will be satisfied with this apparent willingness to 
render justice so long I believe will nothing further be done 

than to profess that disposition ". ^^ 

About this time the old King, Charles XIII, died, and a 
groat deal of extra business had to be taken care of. This was 
also urged as one reason why the claims had not been attended 
to more regularly. But on March 19, 1818, Count Engestrom 
informed the American minister that the affair had been sub- 
mitted to the King with a request for an order to pay the 
claims. ^^ In view of this fact the American minister waited 
for an answer, but none seemed to come. Then Mr. Russell 
made one more determined attempt. On October 5, 1818, he 
sent a note to Count Engestrom, in which he briefly reviewed the 
affair. He said that the representation which had been made 
to the Swedish Government had not only remained without effect, 
but had "not even been noticed with the common courtesy of 
an answer". True, there had been an "interference of a private 
agent of the American claimant" and his presence "furnished 
good cause for suspending all communication between the two 
Governments on the subject", but when that interference "had 

terminated without effect the fitness of such communication 

between the two Governments was necessarily restored". Mr. 
Russell added that "to the value of the merchandise should b3 
added the amount of duties which were paid by the proprietors, 
and the accumulated interest of more than seven years, in order 
to constitute an adequate indemnity".®* 

"'^ Hughes to Secretary of State, July 26, and September 1, 1817. 
"'Russell to J. Q. Adams, April 28, 1818. 

"■'Russell to Engestrom, October 5, 1818; Annals of Congress, 16 Cong.. 
1 sess., II, 2271; Am. State Papers, For. Eel., IV, 638. 



64 RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH SWEDEN 

The effect of this note was that Mr. Russell was asked to 
meet Count Engestrom at the Foreign Office on October 14, 
when he received the information that the Minister had not^ 
yet received the authorization to communicate any decision, but 
he gave Mv Russell an invitation from the King to dine with 
him on the following day. Count Engestrom furthermore asked 
him to withdraw the above note and send him a new one in 
which Mr. Russell would remind the Minister of earlier comuni- 
cations on the subject. Mr. Russell refused to withdraw the 
note, but he promised to send a note in addition to the earlier 
one in which the ideas of the Minister should be followed. The 
reason for this new note was that the note of October 5, had 
partly succeeded and partly failed. The belief that the note had 
succeeded the minister based on the effect it had had in bringing 
about an invitation from the King and the discussion that fol- 
lowed. The opinion that the note had failed was based on the 
failure to obtain an indemnity without further discussion and 
the fear that, if he endeavored to press it, the Government would 
be supplied with "a pretext for an abrupt termination of all 
discussion and perhaps for a categorical rejection of the 
claims".®® 

In answer to the request of the Minister, Mr. Russell sent 
him a note on October 14, 1818, in which a simple statement 
was made of his duty to call "the attention of the Swedish 
Government once more to the claims of American citizens". 
He also said that his confidence in the ''justice and liberality of 
His Majesty" prevented him at the time from "acting on his 
instructions in their full spirit and extent", requesting "his 
excellency to cause this matter to be taken into immediate con- 



"^ Russell to the Secretary of State, October 16, 1818 ; Annals of Con- 
gress, 16 Congress, 1 sess., II, 268 ff. Am. State Papers, For. Rel., IV 
637 f. 



Tin-: STKALSUND CLAIMS 65 

sideration, and to obtain thereon an early and equitable d(3- 
cision". ^" 

Mr. Russell left Sweden October 22, 1818, and therefore 
the answer to his note of October 14, did not arrive before he 
had gone, but it reached him in Berlin. In this answer Count 
Engestrom briefly reviewed the whole controversy and expressed 
a regret that the offer made to Mr. Ecky had been rejected for 
it "seemed to be the only one adopted to meet the views of Mr. 
Eckie [Ecky] ". •^^ The Minister also called attention to the fact 
that, about the same period, "the Swedish Government restored 
to the citizens of the United States thirty-three vessels, with val- 
uable cargoes, then under detention in Sweden, in consequence 
of a formal requisition of the mission of France at Stockholm ' '. 

The above note was answered from Vienna, on December 12, 
1818, and the answer brought out little that was new, but pre- 
sented again in a very forceful way the whole sequestration 
proceedings. Mr. Russell told the Minister that the note from 
Baron Alquier did not contain the necessary condition that the 
proceeds from the sale of the sequestered merchandise must be 
applied to the naval defense of Pomerania, but that the note of 
July 12, which, in his opinion, was the only one applicable, did 
not contain any such provision. ^^ The note of December 12 was 
further supported by a memorial from merchants at Stralsund, 
who petitioned the Government of Sweden not to sell the proper- 
ty as already advertised. ^^ 

Both these notes were forwarded, together with the memo- 
rial from the merchants, to the United States from Florence on 



'"Russell to Engestrom, October 14, 1818; Am. State Papers, For. Eel.. 
IV, 637, Annals of Congress, 16 Congress, 1 scss., II, 2273. 

"Engestrom to Russell, October 27, 1818; Annals of Congress, 16 Cor- 
gress, 1 sess., IV, 2275. 

''Russell to Engestrom, December 12, 1818; Annals of Congress, 16 
Congress, 1 sess., II, 2275-84; Am. State Papers, For. Eel., IV, 640 ff. 

"• Annals of Congress, 16 r^ngress, 1 sess., II, 2284. 



66 RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH SWEDEN 

February 22, 1819. In this report Mr. Russell justified his own 
action in regard to the note from Count Engestrom. "To have 
left it without a comment", he said, "would, I believe, have 
given it a weight to which it was not entitled, and might have 
been construed into an admission, on my part, that the facts and 
arguments which it contained were incontrovertible and un- 
answerable. ^° To prevent such a construction ' ' he sent an 
answer complete and strong. 

Mr. Russell having been recalled, this was his last communi- 
cation in regard to the above claims. Mr. Hughes became his 
successor on October 22, 1818. ''^ In his first despatch to the 
Secretary of State, Mr. Hughes stated that the notes of Mr, 
Russell left nothing further for him to do in the line of "dis- 
cussion with the Government of Sweden on this affair ; and what 
he has said to you without doubt leaves me in the same situation, 
with respect to my notice of it in this despatch". ^^ On Decem- 
ber 1, he also forwarded a copj' of Count Engestrom 's last note 
to Mr. Russell for the information of his Government. ^^ 

So far the claims against Sweden seem to have received 
little attention of Congress, but on February 7, 1820, "Mr. 
Burrell presented the petition of Hugh Calhoun and others, pro 
prietors of certain vessels and their cargoes unjustly sequester- 
ed and sold by the Swedish Government, praying the interposi- 
tion of the Government of the United States". The petition was 
referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations "to consider 
and report thereon".'^* About a month later, March 11, Mr. 
Burrell came to the Secretary of State says John Q. Adams 
"to press what are called the Stralsund Claims upon the Swedish 



"Eussell to J. Q. Adams, February 22, 1819; Annals of Congress, 16 
Congress, 1 sess., II, 2273. 

" House Documents, 19 Congress, 2 sess., No. 73. 
" Hughes to J. Q. Adams, October 23, 1818, 
"Hughes to Secretary of State, December 1, 1818. 
" Senate Journal, 16 Congress, 1 sess., 140 f. 



THE STRALSUND CLAIMS 67 

Government. 1 gave him a particular account of what had 
been done, and read to him Mr. Russell's last note to the Swedish 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Engestrom, concerning these 
claims, and the subsequent correspondence of C. Hughes relating 
to them". '^^ On March 25, the Senate passed a resolution re- 
questing the President to submit to it information relating to 
the Stralsund Claims. In response to this resolution the above 
correspondence was submitted, ''^ but nothing was accomplished. 

For some time very little was done in regard to the Stral- 
sund claims, but on December 14, 1822, Count Engestrom re- 
viewed the whole affair in a note to Mr. Hughes ; and he blamed 
the "Continental System" and its author for the whole inci- 
dent. '^^ That communication appears to be the last one from 
Count Engestrom on the subject, for he retired to private life 
June 10, 1824, and was succeeded by Baron Wetterstedt. ^^ 

Since nothing could be accomplished through diplomatic 
channels Mr. John Council was sent to Sweden as the agent 
"of Stephen Girard and others". The King being absent from 
the Capital, Mr. Connell had to wait about three months before 
he could present his memorial, which he did October 18, 1824. ""^ 
This representation was made with the knowledge and approba- 
tion of the President of the United States. Baron Wetterstedt 
answered that he did not know how soon he could find the 
money to repay the damage to the United States. The Swedish 
Government recognized the justice of the claims and admitted 
"tlie fairness of the terms, but the King was incapacitated by 
the Constitution to act except by and with the consent of the 
Diet," and that body would not meet, unless called into special 
session, before 1828. Mr. Connell 's papers were returned to him 



" Memoirs of John Q. Adams, V, 17. 

'"On April 21, 1820; Annals of Congress, 16 Congress, 1 scss., II, 2264. 

" Engestrom to Hughes, December 14, 1822. 

" Wetterstedt to Hughes, June 30, 1824. 

"Inclosure from Hughes to Secretary of State, November 24, 1824. 



68 RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH SWEDEN 

and the business was left on the old footing. But on January 
31, Mr. Hughes received a note from Baron Wetterstedt re- 
(luesting him not to press the matter for he was gaining ground 
in the cabinet. It was expected, he said, "that if the matter 
was reported favorably, the Diet would act favorably ' '. ^° 

On February 7, 1825, Mr. Hughes notified his Government 
that Baron Wetterstedt offered to cede and sell the island of 
St. Bartholomew to the United States and that the indemnities 
of the citizens of the United States might then be settled from 
the proceeds of the sale. That proposition had, in fact, been 
made in 1818-19, but one reason why the United States did not 
buy the island was that the price 200,000 pounds sterling was 
considered "wild and extravagant". Baron Wetterstedt ad- 
mitted that the sum was rather large and intimated that about 
500,000 dollars would be asked at this time. He added that the 
nearness of the island might make it important as a naval station 
for the United States. *^ 

Two months later the envoy reported that he had had a 
conference with Baron Wetterstedt at which the latter made 
alternate proposals : 

l)that an unofficial engagement in form of a note be ad- 
dressed to Mr. Hughes, recommending the liquidation at 
the next Diet, which the Count considered as a virtual, 
though a dilatory, settlement; or, 

2) by an offer of a round sum to Mr. Connell against a 
full and final discharge. The Count, in fact, preferred 
the latter plan for settlement. 

Mr. Hughes reported that "No attempt is made to deny the 
justice of the claims; on the contrary, it is admitted in evcrj' 
conference in the broadest and most unqualified terms". 

If the first alternative should be decided upon Mr. Hughes 

"• Hughes to Secretary of State, February 3, 1825. 
" Hughes to Secretary of State, February 7, 1825. 



THE STRALSUND CLAIMS 69 

felt satisfied by having the assurance that the matter would be 
recommended to the Diet. On the other hand, if the latter 
alternative should be agreed upon, Mr. Hughes would leav^ 
the settlement entirely to Mr. Connell, who had been supplied 
with full powers and "on whom will rest the responsibility for 
the settlement". 

At the same conference Count Wetterstedt said that if the 
United States would buy St. Bartholomew, he would settle the 
whole affair at once; for as a colony the King had uncontrolled 
right to dispose of it. ^^ 

Count Wetterstedt requested a copy of all the correspon- 
dence concerning the Stralsund claims, and Mr. Hughes sent 
them on Sunday evening, April 24, 1825. In addition he stated 
that it took the Swedish Government only twenty-one days to 
sell and apply the property, but it took fifteen years of nego- 
tiations for an indemnification. ^^ Now Mr. Connell might make 
any compromise he pleased. 

About two weeks later the envoy again wrote to Count 
Wetterstedt regarding a conference they had had with regard 
to the claims. Mr. Hughes was to confer with Mr. Connell and 
report the result, which he did in the following manner : ' ' I 
have seen Connell, and his answer to the questions your excellency 
mentioned to me an hour ago [in conference] follow. 

1. "No insurance company is interested in the claims; 

2. "The property belongs to citizens of the United States 

and no other description of persons"; 

3. The claimants are the original proprietors of the prop- 

erty; the identical persons from whom the property 
was taken in 1810 ; 

4. "The sufferers have never received the smallest indem- 

nity from the Insurance companies; the property was 



Hughes to Secretary of State, April 7, 1S25. 
Hughes to Secretary of State, April 24, 1825. 



70 RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH SWEDEN 

safe in port, and had paid duties ; it was in warehouses 
and therefore the duties of the insurance companies 
ceased". 
Mr. Connell also stated that "his principals have engaged 
to ratify all his acts". ^* 

In a letter to Henry Clay, Mr. Hughes wrote, June 21, 1825, 
"It cannot go many days more until a final settlement of the 
Stralsund claims are made, for the offer of a round sum in 
cash has been made to Mr. Connell, but Connell is trying to get 
10,000 dollars more than the sum offered. It will be decided 
one way or the other in a few days". ^^ On July 16, the agree- 
ment was reached and the necessary documents signed. The 
following is the wording of the original document: "Whereas, 
during the year One thousand eight hundred and ten, sundry 
goods, wares and merchandize belonging to citizens of the 
United States of America, were put under sequestration at Stral- 
sund in Pomerania, then a dependency of the Crown of Sweden ; 
and whereas, said property was disposed of at Stralsund during 
the year one thousand eight hundred and eleven, and the pro- 
ceeds thereof paid into the Royal Treasury of Pomerania ; and 
whereas the subscriber is legally authorized by the full power 
of attorney, to settle, compromise and adjust said claims, in 
such manner as he may judge expedient and fit and also to re- 
ceive payment to give a full and satisfactory discharge for the 
same therefore by virtue of the aforesaid authority, and in con- 
sideration of the fund of Sixty thousand dollars Hamburg Bancs 
paid in hand, in a Bill of Exchange at 90 days date, upon 
Hamburg, drawn by C. D. Shogman Esq. His Swedish and 
Norwegian Majesty's Secretary of State and for the Department 
of Finance and Commerce, do hereby declare, that I accept of 
the said Sixty thousand Dollars Hamburg Bancs, as a full and 



Hughes to Wetlcrstedt, May 9, 182.5. 
Hiighos to Olay, June 21, 1825. 



THE STRALSUND CLAIMS 71 

complete indemnity to the claimants aforesaid and I forever 
release the Government of Sweden from any further claims, for 
or on the acount of any losses or damages which may have ac- 
crued in consequence of the sequestration and sale of the said 
American property at Stralsund". ^° 

The Swedish Government also required a release from the 
American envoy, which was given with the assurance that he 

would ' ' communicate the above pleasant intelligence to his 

government, and he is convinced that it will be a source of 
sincere satisfaction to the President, to learn that the long 
pending and single difficulty, in the diplomatic relations of the 
two Governments is settled and forever put to rest". ^^ 

These documents were later forwarded by Mr. Hughes to 
the Secretary of State, August 8, 1825. The part played by 
the envoy in the negotiations was limited to giving the formal 
discharge after the other parties had agreed on a settlement. 
But since the Swedish Government asked for it, the business 
could not be concluded without his participation. ^^ The Presi- 
dent could, therefore, announce to Congress that the claims on 
"Sweden have been lately compromised by a private settle- 
ment, in which the claimants themselves have acquiesced".*" 

"" State Department Archives. 

"Stockholm, July 16, 1825. 

"' Russell to Secretary of State, August 8, 1825. 

'"Message to Congress, December 6, 1825; Am. State Papers, For. Rel., 
V, 760; Senate Documents, 19 Congress, 1 sess., I, Doc. 2, p. 5; Messages 
and Papers of the Presidents, II, 867. 



CHAPTER IV 

Commercial Relations 

"The two contracting parties grant mutually the liberty 
of having each in the ports of the other, consuls, vice consuls, 
agents, and commissaries, whose functions shall be regulated by 
a particular agreement". ^ Such is the basis for commercial re- 
lations laid down in the treaty of 1783. In keeping with these 
previsions, Swedish consuls were early admitted to Philadelphia 
and Boston. Already on December 3, 1784, a committee of Con- 
gress, composed of Messrs. Monroe, Houston, and Howell, to 
whom had been referred a "commission of consul from his 
majesty the King of Sweden, to Charles Hellstedt," dated Sep- 
tember 2^, 1783, reported in favor of receiving him as consul 
to reside in Philadelphia in the following resolution : ' ' Resolved, 
That the said commision be registered in the Secretary's office; 
and that thereupon acts of recognition in due form be imme- 
diately issued to the several states, in order that they may 
respectively furnish him with an exequatur or notification of 
his quality, that the same may be known and published".^ 
In May of the following year a similar resolution was adopted 
to register the commission of Richard Soderstrom "as consul of 
the Swedish nation at Boston ' ' Massachusetts, ' ' and that there 
upon an act of recognition in due form be immediately issued 
to the commonwealth of Massachuetts, in order that they may 
furnish the said Richard Soderstrom with their exequatur or no- 
tification of his quality, that the same may be made known and 



'Journal of the American Congress (1774-88), IV, 246. 
'Journal of the American Congress (1774-88), IV, 449. 



COMMERCIAL NEGOTIATIONS 73 

published".^ On May 3, 1797, Richard Soderstrom was made 
Consul General for the United States, with Joseph Winthrop as 
vice-consul for South Carolina and Georgia. The Vice Consvd 
arrived on May 26, 1797. 

Sending consuls to reside at the ports of another country 
is but one way of commercial assistance, there being other ways 
which may become just as effective. In 1786, while Thomas 
Jefferson was in France, he was approached by Baron Stael von 
Holstein, the Swedish Ambassador at Paris, on the question as 
to how the SwedLh Island of St. Bartholomew could be made 
most useful to the commerce of the United States. In his 
answer to this inquiry, Mr. Jefferson gave an analysis of the 
whole subject. He said that the island in itself would furnish 
little of its own production that would be of interest. ' ' It remains 
then to make it the instrument for obtaining through its inter- 
mediation such American productions as Sweden can consume 
or dispose of, and for finding in return a vent for the native 
productions of Sweden". If the island therefore would be made 
a free port without a single restriction the following conse- 
quences would follow: 

1. It would draw to itself that tide of commerce "which 

at present sets towards the Dutch and Danish ' ' islands, 
because vessels going to those islands were often ob- 
liged to negotiate a part of their cargoes at St. Eusta- 
ticus, and to go to St. Thomas to negotiate the residue, 
whereas when they would know that there was a port 
where all articles are free both for importation and 
exportation, they would go to that port which enabled 
them to perform by one voyage the exchanges which 
hitherto they could only effect by two; 

2. Every species of American produce whether precious 



^Journals of Congress, X, 130; Secret Journal of the Congress of Con- 
federation, Foreign Affairs, III, 555. 



74 RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH SWEDEN 

metals or commodities, which Sweden may want for its 
own consumption or "as aliment for its own commerce 
with other nations, will be collected either fairly or 
by contraband into the magazines of Saint Bartholo- 
mew"; 
3. All the production which Sweden can furnish within 
itself or obtain to advantage from other nations, will 
in like manner be deposited in the magazines of St. 
Bartholomew, and will be carried to the several ports 
of America in payment for what shall be taken from 
them, 
Mr. Jefferson also saw that this plan might meet with ob- 
jections and he therefore met the objections from the start. 
"If it be objected", he said, "that this unrestrained license 
will give opportunity to the subjects of other nations on ex- 
changes there in which Sweden will be in no ways interested ; 
I say, 1. That there will be a few of these operations into which 
the Swedish merchants will not be taken in the beginning or in 
the long run ; 2. There will be a few of these exchanges into which 
Swedish productions will not enter, when productions of that 
nature are wanted in return; 3. But suppose neither Swedish 
merchants nor productions enter into the operations, what ob- 
jections can Sweden have to other peoples' meeting in one of 
her ports to carry on commercial exchanges"? * 

Baron Stael must have been under instructions from his 
home Government and given the plan his hearty approval, for 
when the King of Sweden in 1786 reported to the Riksdag what 
had taken place since their former meeting he said that "a 

treaty of commerce had been concluded with the United 

States"; the island of St. Bartholomew had been acquired and 
"now declared a free port" which had given Sweden a footing 
in the West Indies. " 

* Writings of Thomas Jefferson (Ford, ed.), IV, 238 f. 

' Quoted by Bain, Gustavus III and his Contemporaries, I, 286. 



COMMERCIAL NEGOTIATIONS 75 

The opening of St. Bartholomew as a free port was made 
in the interest of the mutual trade while Spain and Portugal 
refused "to all those parts of America which they govern, all 
direct intercourse with any people but themselves".® 

During the early days of independence, the commerce of the 
United States suffered greatly from the activity of the Barbary 
pirates. In order to obtain some light as to the action of other 
nations in this regard, John Adams inquired from Baron Stael 
von Holstein, "concerning the presents given by their courts to 
the Barbary powers". The Swedish Ambassador promised to 
write to Stockholm" for full information upon this subject".'' 
Whether any information was obtained from this inquiry or 
the information was not acted upon, the usual sources do not 
state. But in a short time there came an opportunity for Sweden 
to assist the United States in Algiers in another way. Captain 
'Brian wrote to the President of the United States, on Novem- 
ber 5, 1793, that the Swedish consul in Algiers, Mathias Skjol- 
debrand, had befriended ten American vessels with 105 men 
and given them "money to relieve their greatest necessities". 
The Captain expressed the hope that "you will order him to be 
reimbursed, and also paid for his generous advance in the 
ransoming of George Smith, one of the subjects of the United 
States". ^ The following week, November 1793, Captain O'Briaa 
wrote at length to Mr. D. Humphreys about the same question 
in these words : ' ' The Swedish consul depend, would do all pos- 
sible in his power to serve the Americans; but. Sir, you will 
consider that for him to interfere publicly in the American 
business, that he should first have the order of his court; but 
you may depend on his interest in all that can be done with 
propriety". 

The brother of the Swedish consul was also present in Al- 

" Writings of Thomas Jefferson (Ford, ed.), VI, 476, 477. 
'Works of John Adams (C. F. Adams, ed.), VIII, 227. 
• Am. State Papers, For. Rol., I, 418. 



76 RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH SWEDEN 

giers. On request, he took a letter from the President to the 
Bey, " and made use of every winning and requisite argument, 
for the Dey to consider favorably of a peace v^^ith the United 
States, and permit the American Ambassador to come to Algiers ; 
but the Dey has not seemed inclinable, but gave Mr. Skjolde- 
brand Jr. nearly the same answer as he gave Bassara". Captain 
'Brian thought the Dey was "prepossessed against the Ameri- 
cans by the British consul, who had information of your [Mr. 
Humphrey's] destination by the captain of the Portuguese fri- 
gate, and by Mr. Walpole, British resident at Lisbon". Since 
the Minister, Mr. Humphreys, was fully empowered and there 
was great necessity of "something decisive being done". Cap- 
tain 'Brian suggested that Mr. Skjoldebrand Jr. ought to be 
empowered by the minister "to adopt such plans as will be most 
effectual, and be most conducive in bringing about peace". " 

The following day the Swedish consul general of Algiers 
wrote to Mr. Humphreys and explained his position in regard to 
any negotiations between the United States and Algiers. He 
said that his steps would be very carefully guarded in every 
particular and if he should do anything in favor of the Ameri- 
cans, that would instantly be reported to every ' ' court of Europe, 
who would complain to the court of Sweden". In view of this 

fact he might be censured "for having acted without order 

or permission" of his court. For that reason he determined to 
use his brother who was in Algiers in an unofficial capacity to 
deliver the letter of credence for the American Minister and the 
memorial to the Dey. The Swedish consul also suggested to Mr. 
Humphreys that if he wished to use his brother for communi- 
cating with the Dey, that procedure was easily available and he 
would be glad to serve. ^° The same day Pierre Eric Skjolde- 
brand also wrote to Mr. Humphreys and told him that the Swed 



» Am. State Papers, For. Rel., I, 416. 
" Am. State Papers, For. Rel., I, 414. 



COMMERCIAL NEGOTIATIONS 77 

ish consul had been refused admission to Algiers just as the 

American minister had, but that they demanded permission to 

come and he advised Mr. Humphreys to do the same. ^' He 

promised to aid the United States in every way possible if Mr. 

Humphreys should desire to use him; but if "you be pleased 

to honor me with your confidence, I request you, sir, to be so 

good as to remember to give me also a power to make use of 
it. "12 

Mr. Humphreys reported all these things to the Secretarj' 
of State on November 23, 1793, adding that by the tenor of 
these letters "you will clearly comprehend the actual disposition 
of the Dey, and the real state of affairs in the regency". ^^ In 
his report a month later, December 25, 1793, he said that there 
were reasons "to apprehend that some of the combined Powers 
may have an agency in this business". Mr. Humphreys also la- 
mented the departure of Mr. Pierre Eric Skjoldebrand as an 
"extremely disagreeable and inconvenient circumstance for 
us"." 

The departure of Mr. Skjoldebrand must, however, have 
been only temporary, for he was appointed United States consul 
to Algiers after the death of John Paul Jones, on March 28, 
1795. " Again, when Joseph Donaldson Jr. was appointed con- 
sul for the two States Tunis and Tripoli, it was suggested that 
he should "be employed in an agency with Pierre Eric Skjolde- 
brand [now named as consul of the United States to Algiers] 
in ascertaining and agreeing upon the provisional or preliminary 
terms of a treaty with Algiers". ^^ 

Nothing further has been recorded about the work of Swo- 

" Am. State Papers, For. Eel., I, 415. 
"Am. State Papers, For. Rel., I, 415. 
"Am. State Papers, For. Eel., I, 413. 
"Am. State Papers, For. Eel., I, 418. 

"Annals of Congress, 13 Cong., II, 2669; Paullin, C. O. Diplomatic Ne 
gotiations of American Naval Officers, 42. 
" Am. State Papers, For. Eel., I, 529. 



78 RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH SWEDEN 

dish consuls in Algiers in the behalf of the United States until 
the peace commissioners were sent to Algiers. Then Monroe 
suggested in the instructions dated April 10, 1815, that the 
Peace Commissioners, "before proceeding to extremities" should 
make use of the Swedish consul, Mr. Norderling, who "has been 
friendly to the United States ' '. Mr. Norderling could be author- 
ized to carry a letter from the President of the United States 
to the Dey of Algiers and ' ' be authorized and instructed to give 
such answers to the inquiries of the Dey and to make such com- 
munications to him as you may deem most likely to accomplish 
the objects in view". ^^ 

The first consul from the United States to Sweden was Elias 
Backman, whose api^ointment was dated on February 27, 1797. 
On April 27, 1810, Robert G. Gardiner was reported as consul at 
Gothenburg, Sweden. ^^ 

The activity of some of these consuls was not always in the 
interest of friendship between the two nations. Thus the Ameri- 
can Charge 'd affairs, Christopher Hughes, received a letter of 
complaint from Count Axel Rosen, the governor of the district 
in which Gothenburg is located. The governor requested "an 
immediate examination" of the case of the man, Joseph Hall, 
who "no longer merits the honorable confidence to be consul 
of the United States". ^^ About a week later, Mr. Hughes re- 
ported to the Secretary of State that Joseph Hall "is now in 
prison for custom house dues to a great amount". The charge 
d' affairs asked instructions from his Government in regard to 
what course to pursue. ^^ On June 5th, Mr. Hughes reported 
that the former consul had ' ' escaped from his prison and abscond- 
ed", and no further information has been obtained regarding 



" Writiugs of James Monroe (S. M. Hamilton, ed.), V, 373. 

" Annals of Congress, II Cong., 2 sess., 19ft8. 

"Rosen to Hughes, May 18, 1817. 

'° Hughes to Secretary of State, May 28, 1817. 



COMMERCIAL NEGOTIATIONS 79 

his case. ^^ In the same despatch Mr. Hughes notified his Gov- 
ernment that he had "authorized Mr. C. A. Murry of Gothen- 
burg" to assume his duties of consul "until the pleasure of the 
President shall be known on the subject". ^^ 

A year later, when Mr. Russell had returned to his duty, he 
wrote to John Q. Adams that "the interest of our commerce and 
particularly the protection of our seamen require" the appoint- 
ment of some one to perform the duties of consul in Stockholm. 
It had been suggested that the secretary of the legation or the. 
charge d' affairs should be authorized to perform the duties of 
consul. Mr. Russell very strongly advised against that course, " 
but the Government had already on May 28, 1818, appointed 
David Erskine. 

The commercial treaty of 1783 with Sweden came to an end 
in 1798. Although John Q. Adams was authorized to renew the 
treaty and was removed from Spain to Prussia partly for that 
purpose, the treaty was allowed to come to an end without a new 
one being undertaken. It was not before Mr. Russell had become 
Minister to Sweden that a new treaty was finally concluded, 
September 4, 1816. The treaty was submitted to the Senate for 
consideration on Decmber 13, 1816. ^^ The Senate discussed the 
treaty and advised its ratification except articles III, IV and VI. 
Those articles referred to the carrying trade between the two 
countries. Article three provided that all articles produced or 
manufactured in the West Indies, which could be imported into 
Sweden and Norway in their own vessels, might likewise be im- 
ported into those countries in the vessels of the United States 
with no extra duties except only ten per cent of the regular 



" Hughes to Secretary of State, June 5, ISlT. 

" Hughes to Secretary of State, June 5, 1817, 

"Russell to John Q. Adams, Jan. 20, 1818. 

*^ Annals of Congress, 14 Cong., P. 1973; Messages and Papers, I, 566; 
ratification uas advised with amendments, February 19, 1817; Am. State 
Papers, For. Rel., IV, 98 ff; Malloy, Treaties and Conventions, II, 1742. 



80 RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH SWEDEN 

duties on vessels and cargoes. Article four contained the same 
provision in regard to articles produced or manufactured in "the 
countries surrounding the Baltic Sea", imported into the United 
States. Article six specified that whatever the chief custom 
officer should designate and specify as products of a country 
in the clearance papers delivered to the vessel on its departure 
from port that should be acknowledged and admitted as such 
in the country of destination. '^ 

The discussion of the amendments consumed a considerable 
amount of time, so that the Swedish Government became uneasy 
as to the fate of the treaty. The charge d' affairs wrote to the 
Secretary of State in September 1817, that "It may be proper 
to mention the very great fear entertained and expressed here 
that Mr. Russell's treaty should be put into practical operation". 
Mr. Hughes explained that he had received no instruction "on 
the supposition that no subject of that nature would be taken 
up at Washington, until the return of Adams from London". 
There was also an uncertainty in regard to Mr. Russell's return 
to Stockholm. ^^ But when Mr. Russell returned he had received 
instructions that the Senate had rejected the third, fourth and 
sixth articles of the treaty of commerce. He had several subse- 
quent conferences with Count Engestrom in order to ascertain 
the views of the Swedish Government relative to the treaty, and 
he expressed his belief that the treaty would eventually ' * be ac- 
cepted with the retrenchment made by the Senate". -^ 

On January 24, 1818, Count Engestrom notified Mr. Russell 
* * that he was authorized to state that Sweden ' ' would not insist 
on these articles, since they "were not of particular interest 
to Sweden". He was therefore ready to exchange the ratifica- 
tions as soon as "Mr. Russell should receive the treaty properly 



" See Am. State Papers, For. Eel., IV, 98 ff. 

" Hughes to Secretary of State, September 1, 1817. 

"Russell to Secretary of State, December 29, 1817. 



COMMERCIAL NEGOTIATJONS 81 

signed". ^^ The ratifications were exchanged on September 25, 
1818. 

For some reason the Swedish Government delayed to put the 
provisions of the treaty into operation and therefore Mr. Hughes 
who, on the departure of Mr. Russell, was made charge d ' affairs 
in October 1818, sent a note to Count Engestrom requesting "that 
the requisite orders ' ' be issued by the Swedish Government put- 
ting the treaty into operation and that the proper authorities 
should be required to "refund to the American citizens, or to 
their agents, the duties which have been erroneously paid by 
them, subsequent to the exchange of the respective ratifications" 
of the treaty. ^^ The effects of this note could not have appeared 
when the American Consul in Gothenburg wrote to Mr. Hughes 
about the same question ^° on November 7, and on the tenth Mr. 
Hughes received a note from Count Engestrom in which he in- 
formed the charge d ' affairs that the obligations in regard to the 
treaty were being discharged and that "measures were taken lo 
reimburse American citizens who had suffered on this ac- 
count ' '. ^^ The minister of foreign affairs explained to Mr. Rus- 
sell that the reason for the delay in putting the treaty into oper- 
ation was that this duty "came under the department of State 
and Commerce and therefore outside of his field, but that he 
issued a request to that department to hurry matters and he be- 
lieved it was now in force". ^^ 

On January 25, 1819, John Norderling, former Swedish Con- 
sul General at Algiers, called on Mr. Hughes to inform him that 
he had been officially notified by Count Engestrom of his ap- 
pointment as charge d' affairs in Washington. Mr. Hughes add- 



-* Count Engestrom to Russell, January 21, 1818. 
^"Hughes to Count Engestrom, November 3, 1818. 

^'C. A. Murry to Hughes, November 7, 1818; House Documents, VJ 
Cong., 2 sess., No. 73. 

^' Engestrom to Russell, November 10, 1818. 
"^Hughes to Secretary of State, December 4, 1818. 



82 RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH SWEDEN 

ed to the above notice to his Government that Mr. Norderling 
' ' has already a knowledge of our constitution and form of Gov- 
ernment which is rarely met with in Europe ". ^^ In Feb- 
ruary Mr. Hughes, at the request of Count Engestrom, informed 
his Government that Mr. Norderling had been appointed as 
charge d' affairs at Washington. A few days after the date of 
this despatch "the news was received of the death of the Gov- 
ernor of St. Bartholomew". Mr. Norderling was then appointed 
to fill the office of Governor for St. Bartholomew, and in his 
place Baron Stackelberg was appointed to Washington. ^* 

Count Engestrom informed Mr. Hughes that Mr. Norderling 
reluctantly yielded to this change for though the remuneration 
of Governor was "double those of the charge d' affairs, Mr. Nord- 
erling preferred very much the latter place". The Count also ex- 
pressed his belief and hope that the functions and residence at 
St. Bartholomew would only be temporary and that on their 
expiration he would change posts with Baron Stackelberg. ^^ 
The appointment of Baron Stackelberg was dated January 1, 
1819, "at which period Mr. Kantzow vacated the place", but 
Baron Stackelberg did not leave Sweden before May 28, 1819. ^^ 

So far there had been a considerable distinction between the 
vessels of the country and those belonging to the United States. 
The Swedish Government must have realized that such a con- 
dition of affairs was unfavorable to its commerce, for on Janu- 
ary 25, 1821, Count Engestrom sent a note to the American 
charge d' affairs in which he informed him that the King had 
given "express orders" to notify Mr. Hughes that "vessels be- 
longing to citizens of the United States, as well as their cargoes ' ' 
would be subject, "in the ports of the Kingdom of Norway, to no 
higher duties of entry or clearance, than those payable by the 

^Hughes to John Q. Adams, January 26, 1819. 
^ Hughes to Secretary of State, February 25, 1819. 
^ Ibid. 
^Hughes to Secretary of State, May 27, 18] 9. 



COMMERCIAL NEGOTIATIONS 83 

national vessels and their cargoes". This action removed "every 
sort of distinction betvs^een Norwegian and American vessels". 
Neither the place from which a vessel came nor the destination 
of a vessel should be any cause for exception from this general 
rule. The nature of the cargo should not be the cause for any 
exception for the "cargo may consist of the production of the 
soil, or of the industry of such country, whatever it may be". 
Mr. Hughes was requested to forward this information to his 
Government. ^^ 

The following July the Swedish charge d' affairs in "Wash- 
ington addressed a note to the Secretary of State "to inquire 
if, in virtue of the commercial regulations in the United States, 
the Norwegian commerce" would enjoy in the ports of the 
United States, "the same advantages and immunities which have 
been lately granted in the ports of Norway to the American 
commerce". ^^ In a few days the Secretary of State answered 
the above note, but in doing so he pointed out that the act of 
March 3, 1815, which served as a basis for reciprocal action on 
the part of the United States, was not so extensive as that of 
Sweden and Norway in that the act of the United States strictly 
limited its application to "the produce or manufacture of the 
nation". The above act was subsequently amended by an act 
of March 3, 1819, limiting the application of the act to January 
1, 1824. The United States could not, therefore, offer as compre- 
hensive freedom to trade as the Swedish and Norwegian Govern- 
ment had done. But, if it was desired, the President of the 
United States would issue a proclamation granting to the Nor- 
wegian vessels all the freedom of commerce which the laws of the 
United States permitted. ^^ Stackelberg requested, in an answer 

" Engestrom to Hughes, January 25, 1821 ; House Documents, 17 Cong., 
1 sess., No. 123. 

''Stackelberg to Secretary of State, July 11, 1821; House Documents, 
17 Cong., 1 sess.. No. 123. 

» John Q. Adams to Stackelberg, July 23, 1821, House Documents, 17 
Cong., 1 sess.. No. 123. 



84 RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH SWEDEN 

to the above note, that all the advantages which could be granted 
to Norwegian vessels under existing laws should be granted. He 
also suggested that a law ought to be passed in the United 
States according to which the commerce of the two countries 
could be established on ' ' perfect reciprocity ' ', *° In accordance 
with the above note, the President issued a proclamation that 
since "satisfactory proof" had been received "under date of the 
30 day of January 1821, that henceforward all discriminating or' 
countervailing duties in the Kingdom of Norway, so far as they 
operated to the disadvantages of the United States had been and 
were abolished ". ^^ A copy of the proclamation was sent to 
Baron Stackelberg on the following day. ^^ 

At the opening of Congress the following December, Presi- 
dent Monroe called attention to this commercial arrangement 
with the King of Sweden and Norway regarding Norway. He 
called the attention of Congress to the fact that the charge d' 
affairs had "requested the reciprocal allowance for the vessels 
of Norway in the ports of the United States" as were allowed 
vessels of the United States in that country. Since the act of 
March 3, 1815, was insufficient for the purpose and Congress was 
the only part of the Government which could grant the privilege, 
the President submitted the subject "to the wisdom of Con- 
gress".*^ It seems, however, that Congress must have taken a 
rather liberal amount of time for considering the subject, for 
on May 1, the following year, the President sent a special mess- 
age to Congress suggesting again the advisability of such legisla- 



*• Stackelberg to the Secretary of State, August 16, 1821, 17 Cong., 1 
sess., No. 123. 

" Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1, 665. 

"John Q. Adams to Shackelberg, August 21, 1821, House Documents, 
17 Cong., 1 sess.. No. 123, 

■"Annual Message on December 3, 1821, Messages and Papers, 1, 671; 
House Journal, 17 Cong., 1 sess., pp. 15, 544. 



COMMERCIAL NEGOTIATIONS 85 

tion. The message was accompanied with all the corrt-spondence 
on the subject. ** 

The ports of Sweden were not included in the above ar 
rangement, but the question of admitting American ships with 
products from West Indies into Sweden on the same condition 
as Swedish vessels was submitted to the Diet, and that bod}' 
decided to leave the whole question "to the discretion of the 
King", *^ The King decided in favor of this extension of com- 
mercial privileges and therefore instructed Count Engestrom to 
notify Mr. Hughes to that effect, which was done on April 3, 
1824. *" The King did not demand reciprocal action on the part 
of the United States, but Mr. Hughes, in reporting this informa- 
tion to the Department of State, observed that it was ' ' confident- 
ly hoped and expected that some analogous favor and facility 
would be accorded on the part of the Government of the United 
States to Swedish ships and their trade in the United States 
Ports''.*^ In view of this arrangement Mr. Monroe could an- 
nounce at the opening of Congress that "our commerce with 
Sweden has been placed on perfect reciprocity ' '. *^ In this way, 
therefore, the provisions of the treat}' of 1816, which were reject- 
ed by the Senate, were obtained and secured. 

The removal of commercial restrictions in St. Bartholomew 
no doubt was of considerable importance and seemed to extend 
the commerce. In October 1820, Richard Rush wrote from that 
island that "the Swedes and the Danes will, in some measure, 
become the carriers of provisions, etc., for the supply of the 
aforesaid colonies ; for since my arrival here more than thirty 
British vessels have assumed the Swedish flag, and, no doubt. 



^es and Papers, 1, 707; House Documents, 17 Cong., 1 sees., 
No. 123. 

" Hughes Memorandum to the Department of State. 

*" Engestrom to Hughes, April 3, 1824. 

■"Hughes to Secretary of State, April 3, 1824. 

*' Eight Annual Message, Messages and Papers, II, 820. 



86 RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH SWEDEN 

in St. Thomas to a greater extent".*^ But the regulations in 
regard to the admission of consuls to the colony was somewhat 
restricted. There may have been several reasons for this re- 
striction. The two principal reasons for this limitation were that, 
"it was a colony, and because during the French Revolution 
a consul from France had been admitted there", and he "had 
proved very troublesome by his tunbulance". These objections 
were answered completely and convincingly by John Q. Adams. 
He observed that neither of these reasons could "justify the 
refusal to receive an American consul at St. Bartholomew". 
European Governments excluded consuls from their colonies be- 
cause foreign commerce with those colonies "was interdicted". 
If the commerce was interdicted there could be no need of con- 
suls, but if commerce was allowed the consul followed as a matter 
of "course — as much as an army implied a general". The Swed- 
ish Government had allowed foreign commerce with St. Barthol- 
omew, and also specifically named the island in the treaty be- 
tween the United States and Sweden. ^° The inhabitants of the 
island, "their vessels and their merchandise", were entitled to 
the same advantages in the United States as those of Sweden, 
' ' and the citizens of the United States were entitled to the same 
in the island as Sweden. The province of a consul was to secure 
in effect to the people of his nation the real enjoyment in foreign 
ports of the commercial advantages to which they are entitled 
by treaty, or by the laws of nations ' '. ^^ 

If these arguments influenced the Swedish Government or 
not is difficult to state, but the following March Count Engestrom 
notified Mr. Hughes that the Swedish Government would issue 
an exequatur to a United States "consul at St. Bartholomew". " 

**Eushto John Q. Adams, October 4, 1820; Am. State Papers, For. Eel., 
V, 89. 

'"Treaty of September 4, 1816; see also Am. State Papers, For. Rel., 
V, 892. 

" Memoirs of John Q. Adams, VI, 32. 

"Engestrom to Hughes, March 18, 1823. 



COMMERCIAL NEGOTIATIONS 87 

In the following December, therefore, Mr. Hughes demanded the 
recognition of the United States consul at St. Bartholomew in 
accordance with the treaty with the United States. Count Enge- 
strora admitted in unqualified terms the high character of the 
consul and that "no objection existed to him on personal 
grounds". ^^ 

The so called "Russell Treaty" expired by its own limita- 
tions eight years after ratifications were exchanged. The ex- 
change of ratifications took place on September 25, 1818, where- 
fore the treaty expired on September 25, 1826. " This treaty 
was also allowed to expire before a new one was agreed upon. 
The reason for this fact was that Mr. Somerville, who was ap- 
pointed to act as envoy, in that capacity became sick and diea. 
In order to continue the commercial relations provided for in 
the treaty the Swedish charge d ' affairs in Washington addressed 
a note to the Secretary of State on September 26, announcing 
that the Government of Sweden had decided to consider the 
provisions of the old treaty in force until a new one should be 
agreed upon. He was also ' ' authorized to propose to the Ameri- 
can Government to give similar orders in the ports of the United 
States in regard to the Swedish and Norwegian Commerce". In 
addition Baron Stackelberg stated that the King desired that the 
new treaty should be signed at Stockholm, and he expressed the 
wish of the King that the President would "send some one as 
soon as possible to treat in this affair ' '. The Swedish charge d ' 
affairs also stated that Mr. Hughes, the American charge d' 
affairs, in Stockholm, would be acceptible to the Swedish Govern- 
ment to act in that capacity. ^^ Mr. Hughes, however, was not 
appointed, but Mr. John J. Appleton, charge d' affairs in Spain. 

At the opening of Congress the President submitted the 
question as to the continuation of the provisions of the treaty 

"Hughes to John Q. Adams, December 7, 1823. 
"Am. State Papers, For. Eel., VI, 367. 
" Am. State Papers, For. Rel., VI, 367. 



88 EELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH SWEDEN 

with Sweden to Congress for its consideration. ^^ The chairman 
on the committee on Commerce, Mr. Tomlinson, introduced a bill 
containing the above provisions. An opinion was expressed that 
the act of 1824 regarding the commerce with Sweden covered 
the case, but members of the committee held the opposite view. " 
In the meantime, Swedish vessels had arrived in the United 
States, and had been required to pay the "foreign duties".^'' 
The new act authorized the return of such duties charged during 
the interim. Baron Stackelberg was informed, March 16, 1827, 
that Congress passed a bill to "except Swedish and Norwegian 
vessels from the payment of descriminating duties of import and 
tonnage for a limited time". ^^ 

The instructions to Mr. Appleton were dated on January 12, 
1827. According to those instructions the charge d' affairs was 
authorized to renew the treaty with the exception of those ar- 
ticles which the Senate rejected in advising its ratification. He 
was further instructed that the United States desired to see the 
provisions in the treaty that vessels of both parties should be 
"entitled to navigate between the ports of Sweden and Norway 
and the Swedish colony of St. Bartholomew, as well as between 
those ports and all other foreign countries and places ; but the 
vessels of neither party will be entitled to share in the coasting 
trade of the other". Mr. Clay said that the "President was 
anxious to secure the adoption of the general principle without 
qualifications". If the variations made in order to secure the 
adoption of this principle should be rejected, Mr. Appleton was 
authorized to renew the old treaty with the exception of articles 
third, fourth, and sixth. ®^ 



"Messages and Papers, II, 919; Senate Documents, 19 Cong., 2 sess., 
No. 1, p. 6; Am. State Papers, For. Eel., VI. 208. 
" Abridgement of Debates, IX, 428-9. 
^'Am. State Papers, For. Eel., VI, 368, 719. 
^"Am. State Papers, For. Eel., VI, 719. 
""Am. State Papers, For. Bel., VI, 720. 



COMMERCIAL NEGOTIATIONS 89 

It had been reported to Washington that a treaty had been 
concluded between the Governments of Sweden and Great Brit- 
ain, which gave a considerable advantage to British vessels. Mr. 
Appleton investigated and found thai the alleged advantage 
consisted in certain port dues. From the report submitted it is 
gathered that on 100 vessels the total charges for Swedish ves- 
sels were $101.07, for American vessels $112.34, and for British 
vessels $110.57. Those figures show that the difference in port 
dues between the vessels of the United States and Sweden in 
Swedish ports was $11.27, and between the vessels of the United 
States and Great Britain was less than two dollars. ®^ 

The negotiations proceeded from April 5, when Mr. Apple- 
ton announced that he was authorized and ready to negotiate, 
till July 11, when he notified his Government that the new treaty 
had been signed. '^ 

The new treaty placed the vessels of the United States in 
the ports of Sweden, Norway, and the Island of St. Bartholomew 
on a footing of "perfect equality with vessels of those countries" 
in regard to the general import and export trade. The duties 
and "charges of all kinds were the same for vessels of both 
parties". The products of the United States were admitted 
into Sweden, Norwaj^ and St. Bartholomew on the same terms as 
similar products from any other foreign country ; into Sweden 
and Norway on "the same terms as similar products from their 
West India colony, and into the colony as similar products from 
the mother country". 

The only exception to these principles were the following: 

1. In regard to vessels, the reserve was "made by each 
State of its own coasting trade"; 

2. In regard to both vessels and products a reserve was 

made by Sweden and Norway of their trade with P"'in- 

land; 

"Am. state Papers, Tor. Rel., VI, 721. 

" Am. State Papers, For. Rol., VI, 720, 725. 



90 RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH SWEDEN 

3. In regard to products alone, a reserve was made by 
Sweden and Norway "of particular advantage to the 
tallow and tallow candles from Russia". ®^ 

The treaty was submitted to the Senate for advice with 
regard to its ratification on December 12, 1827, ®* and this body 
practically without discussion advised its ratification January 7, 
1828, and the ratifications were exchanged January 18, 1828. 
On the following day the President issued a proclamation de- 
claring the treaty in force. ^° 

This then may for all practical purposes be considered the 
close of the early negotiations. In 1830, the two countries had 
exchanged public ministers, settled the claims which grew out 
of an application of the continental system, established a firm 
relation based on treaties, and had consular representatives each 
in the more important ports of the other. All regular relations 
had therefore been established at that time and the Presidents 
have announced to succeeding sessions of Congress that ' ' with the 

Government of Sweden the best understanding exists. 

Commerce is fostered and protected by reciprocal good will, 

under the sanction of liberal conventional and legal provi- 
sions". ^^ 



"'Am. State Papers, For. Eel., VI, 726. 

" Messages and Proclamations, II, 959 ; Am. State Papers, For. Rei., 
VI, 707. 

** Malloy, Treaties and Conventions, II, 1748. 

""Journal of the Senate (1834-5), 6; Messages and Papers, II. 1316; 
Senate Documnts, 24 Congress, 1 sess., I, 5. 



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I 



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011 see'^lf 



